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BRIEFS

NUCLEAR MISSILES AT ISTRES--A squadron of the tactical air force (FATAC)-the Limousin squadron-has been stationed at the Istres base in the department of Bouches-du-Rhone since Friday, 1 August. It consists of 15 Jaguar combat aircraft equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. This is the fifth squadron of the French air force ready to launch AN-52 bombs of 10 to 15 kilotons (destructive power slightly less than that of the explosion at Hiroshima). Previously four squadrons - a total of 30 Jaguar and 30 Mirage III-E airplanes stationed at Saint-Dijier and at Luxevil in eastern France - had been equipped with the same nuclear weapon. At present, France's tactical nuclear arsenal, with five squadrons of Mirage and Jaguar Aircraft and five Pluton [Pluto] artillery regiments, involves about 8,500 men with an annual budget on the order of 2.9 billion francs, which is 3.3 percent of the total of military expenditures for 1980. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 3-4 Aug 80 p 14] 11706

FRANCOPHONE VICE PRIME MINISTER SPITAELS INTERVIEWED

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 4, 5

[Interview with Guy Spitaels by Guy Daloze--date and place unspecified]

[Text] [Question] Guy Spitaels, you spent all your youth in Ath?

[Answer] Yes! I didn't leave my town for 28 years. But Ath was then very different from what it represents for me today. If I think back to my youth, I would say that literature and sports were the main thing. Later, I cultivated this passion for literature a bit at university.

[Question] What were your favorite authors?

[Answer] My preferences were rather banal, those of a little classical gentleman: the 5 "M's": Montherlant, Morand, Mauriac, Maurois, Malraux. Later, I read Nimier, Blondin, and several others.

[Question] These were personal discoveries?

[Answer] More like school discoveries. In rhetoric, in the school at Ath, I had a professor who, although we had throughout the year studied above all the plays of Claudel, Racine, Corneille, and Musset, asked us on the test to do a dissertation on "love in the five M's". At age 17, that was not so bad.

I also remember that this fellow, who was out of the ordinary, sometimes read us articles out of the "Figaro literature" to make it up [to us]. So the climate nourished more interest in literature than in mathematics, a subject in which I was very poor. Thus, at the end of the first trimester, I was first in the class, with..3 out of 50 [points] in trigonometry...

[Question] You had to catch up later, since you became budget minister?

[Answer] Perhaps.

[Question] And sports?

[Answer] I played football up to the provincial school [games] level with the Ath team. Today I still run into schoolmates from that period who played on the first team, an honor I never had.

I also played tennis. I stopped at a pretty modest level, but a not too shameful one all the same, C-15, 3/6e.

[Question] And do you still play?

[Answer] Hardly at all anymore, except among friends. It's better not to give oneself over too much to that sport without physical conditioning, and I am too much out of shape at the moment.

An Emotional Tie to My Town

[Question] You are still attached to Ath?

[Answer] I remained truly fastened to my town, without realizing it right away. After an absence of some 10 years, there was a return home which was at first a calculated political move. A politician must have a base, and in '74, some of my friends thought it would be good for me to fill a position in the region. This decision seemed reasonable to me, and in any case I did not want, at any price, to be coopted, squeezed like an orange, and thrown out like one. What started out as a rational decision became something completely different, and I would say that after 40 months of activity in the [national] government, I nevertheless like working at the local level much better.

[Question] For what reasons?

[Answer] Pardon me for using cliches which seem hackneyed, but I was amazed to feel a real pleasure in working to get a billion [Belgian francs] in [public] works for Ath to build schools, an administrative center, a burn treatment center, a sports complex, for restoration of the town hall, etc.

Some Sundays, I go to visit the community work-yards. There you have a very concrete contact with reality which touches me to the quick. Compared to my life in government, where aggressiveness and conflicts are the currency of exchange, this direct relation, this emotional tie to the people gives me much pleasure. I did not become a burgermeister for all that, but I would be pained to give it up.

Finally, I feel quite keenly the difference between my personal situation and that of those who have "baled out" [of their own home constituencies]. In Ath I am known personally, my parents still live in the town; I can't cheat anybody. At first I was proposed as a candidate for Tournai, "a notch higher." There is not a single day I don't rejoice at having refused. I consider how totally artificial my arrival at Tournai would have been.

[Question] You left Ath for several years to go study at Louvain.

[Answer] Yes, I obtained two degrees there; law, and political and social sciences, in order later to become a professor at ULB [Free University of Brussels]. I kept busy at Louvain with a literary circle, a review...

[Question] ...And you broke with Catholicism. Why?

[Answer] My questioning solely concerned the divinity of Christ. All the rest seemed to me secondary: morality, questions of the Church, etc. But already, during my studies, I no longer considered myself a believer.

[Question] Your "no" was an intellectual response?

[Answer] That is what I was told at the time. A friend confided to me: "I do not know if you lost faith, I think you never had any."

The Emotional Shock of '60

[Question] Your espousal of socialism, then, was a conversion, or was it a logical conclusion?

[Answer] I joined the PSB [Belgian Socialist Party] at the time of the great strikes of '60. To give the lie to those who want to depict me as only an intellectual, I will say that it was under the [influence of the] emotional shock of what I perceived as a serious battle that I took the step. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems to me that I was already committed on this path previously, and in a perhaps more radical way. Thus I recall having published at Louvain an article reproaching Merleau-Ponty for his break with Marxism, which seemed to me the solution to all questions. That earned me a summons to see the vice-rector.

So I was more doctrinaire. Me, little Spitaels, in the foolishness of my 20 years, I reproached Merleau-Ponty for his abominable action...

Also, one day I had Marcel Busieau come to Louvain to discuss the school question. While he expected a confrontation, he left astonished at my [close] alignment with PSB positions, and he invited me to meet Leo Collard at Parliament. I had to refuse this meeting, one of my friends having once again been threatened by the university rectorate.

[Question] You had never been an activist before in Catholic organizations?

[Answer] Oh, yes, at Ath, but my real commitment dates from my adherence to the socialist movement. In joining the party I left the academic circles I had frequented, "Friends of the Relief" for example. I ceased to be anything but a progressive spirit. I joined a structured organization, I was paying my dues, my stamps to the FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium], I had an account at the Co-op.

In this connection, I would like to point out several things. First of all, that Marxism no longer appears to me as the answer to all the questions. Next, that my position in the PSB is much less unusual than some people say. Thus Henri Simonet and Guy Cudell also associated "school with God." And if one takes an example in a neighboring country, Francois Mitterrand and Jacques Delors lived in analogous situations.

In my local life, in my relations with members of the PSB bureau, in my relations with the president, my Catholic origin has never been a hindrance.

[Question] So the final straw was the strikes of '60?

[Answer] Yes, I had the impression of finding myself facing a very important social struggle from which I could not remain apart. I considered at the time that it was a question of an action to defend the working class in the face of unjust social measures. Next I perceived the urgency of setting in motion a plan for the economic reforms indispensable to Walloonism. At the time, I was also affiliated with the Walloon Popular Movement. [MPW].

[Question] What is it that seemed especially unjust to you?

[Answer] Let us say that above all I had the impression that society was divided into two camps, from which comes my adherence to socialism and to the MPW. At that time, for the first time, I explained my position to my students: it [my explanation] was devoted to the terms of the one law. But that was not the main thing.

[Question] It was still an intellectual decision?

[Answer] Honestly, in December '60 I was 100 leagues from thinking that one day I would have a political career. My commitment was rather an emotional one. My only ambition at the time was to become a university professor.

[Question] You knew Andre Renard?

[Answer] I saw him very infrequently, but each encounter was quite moving. The man himself was moving. Even his class enemies praised his charm.

Committed in the Battle for Secularism

[Question] Did you become anti-clerical after this rupture?

[Answer] I have never hidden my opinions, and at ULB I was openly engaged in the battle for secular schooling. But I believe in Article 1 of the by-laws of my party which says that all progressives should be able to join us. I stated in 1974, at a doctrinal conference, that I did not believe in the idea of bringing all progressives together, a notion which was at that time very much in vogue. I did not see, I do not see, why the Christian Democrats, who were associated with the government since the liberation, except during 5 years, should come bind themselves to the PSB.

I still should not be able to understand why the PSB should be one of the few Belgian parties where those who go to mass can't find a place. I believe that this view of the PSB is anachronistic. Whatever my personal commitment may be, I think the Catholics got my message, it is clear.

With respect to other members of my party I am perhaps in a position to understand better this kind of problem. I consider in any case one must not fight the wrong adversary.

[Question] Do you put that into practice at Ath?

[Answer] Yes! I have entertained the bishop of Tournai. But he knows my positions. Besides, I consider that by not keeping my flag in my pocket I am better understood in certain circles.

Sometimes this finds concrete expression. Thus, it can make a difference of 7 percent for the PSB whether I am up for election or not.

The College of Europe, the Congo

[Question] After Louvain, ULB?

[Answer] Not right away. First there were studies at the College of Europe, in the economics department headed by Professor Tinbergen. From there, I was in principle supposed to go on the staff of Edgar Pisani in Paris. We had met at a colloquium. But I was going to get married, my future wife was at that time a legal secretary at the world fair, and it was not much fun for her to quit this work she loved. Meantime, there came my military service, during which I learned that the Sociology Institute at ULB was recruiting a research worker for the Congo. Connection was made with Professor Doucy, who found we understood each other straight off. I then gave up France to begin studying problems of social economics in businesses in the Congo. Subsequently I was to scale all the rungs one by one, something which was still possible in the time of the "golden Sixties." All of it, and it is to the honor of my house, without my two degrees previously earned being obstacles.

I retain an excellent memory of my university life for, at bottom, I adore working with a team. Thus, I was able to surround myself with ten research workers to form a permanent team. The university is in this respect quite different from government, where everything must always be re-built. For example, I am on my fourth chief of staff in 3 years. In human terms, too, these environments are quite different.

[Question] In the Congo, did you have contact with many personalities?

[Answer] Especially through my wife, who was a member of the bar in Leopoldville, and was a member of a set of pluralist advocates [sic], a rather unusual thing at the time. It defended Africans like M'Polu, and also handled the Lumumba case. Myself, I knew Kasavubu, through Kanza, a former student at Louvain. My wife was also an adviser to the PSA [expansion unknown] faction Kamitatu which, in 1961, wanted to collaborate with us. But when I returned to the Congo, that year, it was already "falling apart." Africa at that point seemed more and more closed, it was necessary for me to make a decision at the Institute of Sociology, and I opted for Belgian affairs.

[Question] What is your opinion now on the Congolese problem?

[Answer] I think I participated in the general blindness. I believed, like everyone else, that the institutions were well adapted, which obviously showed a quite serious mistake in judgment for a specialist in the social sciences. But everyone did the same. I also underestimated the obstacles to economic development and I was wrong about the future of Sekou Toure's movement in Guinea. But I do not regret these years devoted to a sector which is today hopeless.

Strong Authority, Strong Opposition

[Question] After a period of calm came May 1968; what lessons do you draw from it?

[Answer] Basically I was very ill at ease. Everything was going too fast. And I keep thinking of that painful rhyme about self-management. Seriously, I think that today the centers of power are diversified, and the big parties are no longer necessarily the conductors of all the changes in society. I maintain that society and its administrative apparatus cannot be totalitarian. Within the workers' movement, I have many reservations about self-management. I firmly criticize authoritarian management, but I nevertheless think there is a balance to strike. For example, I am for the strengthening of the powers of the Council on Business, and of the trade union delegation. I was for the direction pursued, but against the form taken. I feared there would be smashing of machines, and at ULB one still detects traces of this tumult. To sum up, I am for a balance between strong authority and strong opposition. Not [for] continual holiday.

[Question] Was ULB a good place?

[Answer] Yes. When I arrived, I was very proud to see passing through the halls of the Institute of Sociology people like Doucy, Troclet, Vermeylen, Harroy, Henrion, and Janne. After '68, self-administration and its excesses, many people totally dropped out.

Entry Into Politics

[Question] Then you were to go from intellectual assistance to the trade unions, to Edmond Leburton's staff and a political life. How did this all unfold?

[Answer] Obviously I knew many socialists on sight at ULB. During the strikes at Limbourg, Frederic Francois asked me to referee a televised debate. This doubtless contributed to making me known in circles to which I was still a stranger. A little later, Andre Cools proposed me for chief of staff for Mr Major, in Employment and Labor [department]. I refused this position, while accepting a mission which consisted in preparing the national conference on employment. This took 3 months. At the time when the next government was being formed, Edmond Leburton warned me that he wanted to give me an important position on his staff. Andre Cools wanted my nomination as private secretary.

[Question] So you got into politics thanks to him?

[Answer] Absolutely.

In connection with the Leburton staff, I will say that I was rather like Fabrice at the Battle of Waterloo. I still wonder why I was given such important duties while I knew so little about things. I really went to work, but it is not certain that I understood everything that was happening then. I was doubtless too young. My political sense was awakened, however, and I had a very frank talk with Leburton. Before the La Hulpe summit, I urged him to "swoop down" on the community terrain.

[Question] Your own ministerial career was later on there. Is this related?

[Answer] Of course. But in Belgium, it is not, I think, very difficult to become a minister.

[Question] Do you think you can already draw up a personal balance-sheet?

[Answer] Influenced by my life in government, my sensitivity to social questions, and my determination to master economic life, my socialist language will become even stronger. My stay in government has also made me more of a Walloon.

[Question] That's not very surprising since you were a member of MPW.

[Answer] That was sentimental. But I see now the bitterness of the conflicts of interest. I saw how certain cases were treated. I played my part as national minister without throwing oil on the fire, but undeniably I am more firm in my Walloon convictions after 3 years of being in the government.

[Question] Walloon or Francophone convictions?

[Answer] Francophone. For I think that everyone, socialists, Christian Socialists, and I hope liberals, we are determined not to abandon Brussels, where the real community problem lies. But Walloon [convictions] too, for which I do not wish to see disappear, I see centrifugal forces at work, as they are in other countries. The regionalization put in place is very important for me, but the relations between the communities will stay as they are.

More Socialist Than Before

[Question] How do you define your socialism today?

[Answer] The usual idea is that power tempers [ideology]. As far as I am concerned, however, I will tell you that I am more of a socialist today than when I arrived in government, and basically for social and economic reasons. But believe me, I get "puffed up" when someone draws up proposed restrictions

for people who must live on 13,000 Fr. per month. One forgets, too, that the average Belgian is still a laborer whose wife does not work. When I put that on one side, and on the other the extraordinary maneuvers unloosed as soon as one has a mind to touch certain privileges, and which [maneuvers] I have seen, I do not hesitate. I don't like to misuse terminology, but I see there the characteristics of a class society.

[Question] Must we then seek a new societal model?

[Answer] When my time in government is over, I will indict certain aspects of socialism. I will emphasize the Walloon aspect. As for my party, I do not think it is rotten inside, but it is obvious that a socialist party cannot withstand an economic crisis like the one we are in without having to re-think things and take its bearings.

With faith in the justice of our initiative in the economic and social domain, and through affirmation of our Walloon and Francophone character.

[Question] Is there a difference between Flemish and Walloon socialism?

[Answer] Profound. I rejoice every day that I am a member of the PSB and not any more of the United PSB.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because our reactions are different, and we are confronted with economic problems of another kind. It is not a question of which one is more leftist.

[Question] This difference, then, does not result from a doctrinal quarrel, but more from a conflict of interest?

[Answer] Exactly.

[Question] Let's go to the serious problem of unemployment. Are there not here abuses which must be fought, in your opinion?

[Answer] Certainly there are abuses. I myself have at times taken measures with respect to them. We must strengthen controls. But one must not believe that the person without a job can remain peacefully sitting at home. For instance, do you know that each year there are 35,000 exclusions?

[Question] What do you think of the solutions just recently advanced by the FEB [Federation of Belgian Enterprises]?

[Answer] I repeat: we can still curb intolerable abuses. Are there ways to curb expenditures in health insurance and unemployment insurance? Yes, but with a 30 billion [Fr.] gap between expenditures and income with respect to unemployment insurance, I'm supporting the Martens proposals. I don't think we can say that one or the other side, employers or trade unions, is completely right. To fill the gap there will be some "subsidies," some "assessments," and last "reduction of expenditures."

The FEB ideas are to be considered, and I have other proposals too: the role of insurance companies with respect to work accidents, for example. With respect to health insurance, I have tried to get several reforms working, but unfortunately we have not received all the help we wanted from the ministry of finance. I have also proposed that the certification of disabled persons be taken away from the mutual benefit societies, but the government has struck with more timid proposals regarding the control of false VIPO's [expansion unknown]. We wanted to curb spending through such concepts as the health log-book and the welfare benefits profile, and the regulation of services. This is all to say that socialists do not want to be identified with a lax policy.

[Question] When all is said and done, we really have little information about the sociological profile of the jobless person. Is he always someone in need?

[Answer] The governmental agreement, you realize, excluded the notion of a state of need. I will point out to you that there is no right to permanent unemployment benefits, [and] after several months more rigorous controls are in force. But let us take the example of a female textile worker in the Mouscron-Leuze region. Laid off at age 30, she will doubtless not find another job. And what will she get? About 10,000 Fr., not more. She has a right to it, she has paid her dues like the others.

Giving Tools to the State

[Question] We would like now to [you as] the former budget minister. For example, with respect to the recent reform measures to be taken, don't the different pressure groups end up by neutralizing each other, when the government, in a word, accepts a lame compromise?

[Answer] The budget bill is 80 billion in the red, this is an unprecedented thing. The discussions leading to this were very difficult. Personally, I do not accept the image of this society as "paralyzed," which implies that the FEB presses from one side and the trade unions from the other, and that the government turns round in circles: No, we can still make serious budgetary decisions.

[Question] But it is hard to see the common thread holding this bill together.

[Answer] Your question confirms my experience in public life which has reinforced my belief on one point: we need a much stronger state. We, the socialists, are not responsible for the progressive extension of the state. We, like the liberals, are transient members of the government, whereas the Christian family has been there for 35 years.

Today the state is everywhere: it has economic functions, an investment function, and a social role. But it is everywhere weak! Everywhere disarmed, because it does not have the tools to control the things the Chambers have entrusted to it. One can see this in energy consumption, railroads, Zeebrugge:

the state is not master of the policy it wants to regulate. The idea that economic life must be visible to be controlled by the state is at the heart of socialism.

[Question] Liberalism has sometimes idealized the market. Doesn't socialism idealize the state?

[Answer] I do not want to see the sphere of public power further extended, but I would like it to really assume its responsibilities. My state cannot be that of Mrs Thatcher or Mr Reagan.

We cannot be the puppets of financial groups that practice the politics of the fait accompli. What can one say about a minister of economic affairs who learns at the same time as the press about lay-offs taking place in certain sectors? This is intolerable! I have little regard for the Eastern countries. But I put up with our own excuse for a state just as badly. For me, sincerely, the state remains the best guarantor of the public interest.

Martens III: Vigilance

[Question] Let's go back to your experience as a minister. How does one form a government?

[Answer] Contrary to what some people think and write, it is not a social game. The announcement of the final composition is preceded by endless discussions among the various leaders. Nothing is certain, anything can change, up to the last moment, when all the elements of the machinery are locked in.

In my case you know that in the previous government I defended a reasonable [level of] austerity, playing, moreover, a difficult role before Congress and my party. I was simply surprised that upon the arrival of the liberals, we suddenly are rolling in billions of dollars, [to such an extent] for example as to allow the removal of tax on investments. I could not uphold two different views only a few months apart. I support the entire government statement. I continue to participate in the government because it has other objectives. But I preferred to take an investing department, Communications.

[Question] Gaston Eyskens supposedly said, at a time when there were 25 ministers, "If I can pick out six or seven of them [myself], it's wonderful." Can Mr Martens still do as much?

[Answer] Certainly not. And I have doubts about the quotation you have cited.

[Question] Do you believe the process for naming ministers is effective in combatting the weakness of the state that you deplore?

[Answer] What is important for the cohesion of a team is that the ministers be representative of their party. It is in the interest of the prime minister to have the strongest men. Stability comes through the control of the party

apparatuses. The first time I became vice prime minister, I learned this on the negotiating room floor. The last time, on the other hand, I was associated quite closely with the work of Andre Cools.

[Question] How do you see the future of the Martens III government?

[Answer] I foresee that everything will be shifted, in September, toward the budgetary, economic and social areas, with a "breather" in the community sector. In any case I am on guard against taking entrenched positions with respect to the liberals. It has not been proven that the present formula is in itself bad. In 1973, Pierre Descamps stood by us at several difficult moments. I believe that there are progressive men today in the liberal party. There was perhaps too much implacable hatred of Francois Perin. I do not believe he was made to govern. But this is not the sole objective for a politician. He is undeniably a creative soul. I did not agree with Robert Henrion's proposal, but I consider him also to be an open person. So no one party has a monopoly on ideas. However, it is evident that some persons came into the government spoiling for a fight, and the new session, I confess, will not necessarily be pleasant. I remain vigilant and watchful of their intentions.

In any case, I believe more in a center-left coalition than in a coalition between and socialists and the Christian family.

[Question] Let's move on to your present field: communications. Do you intend to promote transport in general? Your predecessor laid more emphasis on the need to balance the budget.

[Answer] We will not be able to repeat the price increases decided last year.

[Question] Why the recent merger of Belgian National Railroads and SNCV [expansion unknown]?

[Answer] I wanted to lower the fixed costs of the two companies. The personnel will not be laid off, profitability will be better assured, state subsidies can be held in check. There was also the idea of reconsidering the plan to rationalize the railroads, so opposed in Walloon.

The Need to Breathe, But...

[Question] Does Guy Spitaels have the leisure time to be interested in anything other than his job?

[Answer] Almost not at all. Sometimes I watch a television broadcast, or read something other than the political sections of the dailies, but I think that everyone with an important role in political life is absolutely absorbed by his profession.

[Question] Do you see any way out of it?

[Answer] No. And it is doubtless for this reason that many jump off the merry-go-round.

[Question] Do you feel good inside?

[Answer] Mostly I deplore the fact that I can never take a vacation. I would love, for example, to reflect on the crisis we are presently experiencing, read things on this subject, discuss it. I do not have time, I am a public servant. Altogether, my feelings are mixed. But it is true that I am especially well informed, and that I don't waste my time.

[Question] Is this the taste of power?

[Answer] Not just that. Knowledge must lead to action. I love to act. I do not like to lose.

[Question] But would you want someday to turn over a new leaf?

[Answer] I will have to steel myself to do it, otherwise there will be nothing left of me. Henri Janne advised me one day to leave the scene in time. Yes, I feel the need to breathe,...but what would I do then? Would I find all that I had accomplished absurd, or would I "start back" again as quickly as possible? I have no idea.

In any case, I am well adapted to what I do. And I am not certain I would be able to fit back into the University again easily. I have much sympathy for my students, I love the human warmth of the faculties. But isn't the university a bit removed from certain realities?

[Question] Won't you be easily addicted to power?

[Answer] I am sure of one thing, and that is that I will not leave my region. Sometimes I am intoxicated with the prospects for the future, and at other times, my cup runneth over. I want only one thing: just to be.

9516

CSO: 3100

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTREME RIGHT, FANE SCRUTINIZED

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Rene Haquin]

[Text] One sees five landscapes in the panorama of the extreme right in Belgium, if one will so much as agree to describe as "extreme right" groups that are embraced by neither the left, nor the center, nor the classical right, according to the sensible definition given in 1974 by CRISP*: the conservatives (of which some 100 national unity movements were joined together in 1967 in the Belgian national bloc), the traditionalists (with the organization of public welfare created by Louis Gueuning in 1960, and the national party created the following year during the Congo crisis), the nationalists (with Were di, the Nem clubs, the Erasmus Circle, GRECE, New Order...), the anachronists (Belgian National Socialist Union, the Belgian Alliance) and the neo-fascist and revolutionary nationalists.

It is in this latter category that the poisonous snakes of the extreme-right can be situated, Young Europe (child of the movement for civic action and of the action committee for the defense of Belgians in Africa), European revolutionary groups, the Occident movement, the European Party, the Walbonite movement, the Belgian social movement (in close contact with the Italian Social Movement (MSI), the royalist movement and its splinters, the new Vlaams Militant Order, Voorpost, Aktie centrum Delta, etc.

Internal struggles, divergent factions, splinterings and reunifications are as numerous in the extreme right as in the extreme left. It is particularly difficult to follow the development of every group. But one can say that all these movements have contacts with other extreme-right circles in Europe, each according to its affinities. There exists a Euro-right which covers Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. More recently an American movement, "New Solidarity" was established in various European countries and notably in Brussels and Walloon.

* Center for Socio-Political Research and Information.

Violence

In a sporadic way the organization of training camps, sometimes armed, mainly by the Vlaams militanten orde, has been denounced. Several extreme-right groups, including the Youth Front, also participate in training but claim it is athletic training, unarmed. However, on several occasions, arms have been seized on the premises of certain organizations and it is recalled that the leader of the Youth Front was convicted of transporting prohibited arms, and that a trial for [alleged] duress is pending before the Brussels correctional court, while Eriksson and members of the VMO [Vlaams Militante Orde] are presently under indictment for breaking the law on private militias.

Several movements periodically cover the walls of Brussels and other cities with racist or anticommunist slogans. Some of them claim to reject all direct violence, but others have claimed responsibility, as did the Youth Front, for actions of symbolic violence (an embassy smeared with blood, premises whitewashed, etc...).

The police and gendarmes specially charged with surveillance of extremist groups (right as well as left, they maintain) have noticed for several years the indications of direct violence, with the utilization of Molotov cocktails, the discovery of clandestine arms purchases or the confiscation, on the premises of extreme right groups or in the homes of militants who belong to these groups, of arms, munitions, and even explosives.

Similarly, it has been observed that the members of certain branches (in Tournai and Liege, notably) have decided once again to wear the brown uniform of the Nazis. But, outside the VMO, it is considered in intelligence circles that none of these groups presently represents a threat at the national level.

In 1971, when Gorgio Almirante, the secretary general of the MSI (neo-fascist) was banned from Belgium, the security services discovered the existence of an armed extreme-right cell, in the Italian quarters of Brussels.

Contacts

FANE [Federation for European National Action] in Brussels maintains contacts with the European party EPE [explanation unknown]*, with the staff of the periodical ALTAIR in Braine-l'Alleud, with the Occident movement in Charleroi, the Youth Front, the national Rex [sic] movement, the Vlaams Blok and especially with Roeland Raes du Voorpost.

* One of the groups that condemns all violence.

At a pilgrimage to the Yser tower in Dixmude on 29 June, 40 members of FANE met with extreme-right Belgian movements, and one of the leaders, Michel Leloup, had a chance to speak. FANE also met Sunday afternoon with German neo-Nazis at Ypres.

FANE's agents in Brussels and Walloonie are Jacques Brosu, of the European Party, and Luc Michel, of Occident (Charlefoi).

Elsewhere, at the time of the first Fascist council organized near Paris early this year by FANE, the presence of three Belgian delegates was noted: Daniel De Conynck, Algemeene Vlaamse Jeugdverbond, Jacques Brosu, and Luc Michel, as one can also ascertain from the periodical VOX EUROPAE for March.

Finally, CORRIERE DELLA SIERRA indicates that the Nice branch of FANE is composed of some 30 members and reports the rumor that the billion taken by Spaggiari and his sewer men was destined to finance the European extreme-right. One of the Spaggiari's lieutenants, Jacques Peyrat, was supposedly seen several times at meetings of New Order in Milan, and he reportedly belongs, along with other members of the Maritime Alps branch of FANE, to the group known as "Camerati," partisans of direct action.

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CSO: 3100

MINISTER DE WULF FIGHTS SOCIAL SYSTEM ABUSES

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 9/10 Aug 80 p 3

[Article]

[Text] In a memorandum recently sent to all bureaus in the National Employment Office [O.N.Em.], Mr De Wulf, the minister of labor, gives three kinds of instructions for regulating the legal obligations of the jobless, strengthening the legal armament of the O.N.Em., and improving the efficiency of the Administration. He intends thereby to hunt down abuses, in order to meet the commitments made at the governmental level [cabinet level] to reduce total unemployment benefits by a total of 1 to 1.2 billion [Belgian francs].

In order to facilitate contacts between job-seekers and those trying to place them, the minister asks, in the first type of instruction, for a better analysis of the qualifications of job-seekers, and for probing their actual intention to work by regularly asking them about the efforts they have made with potential employers.

"Schemes"

Desirous, in the second place, of putting an end to the laxity of certain O.N.Em. Bureaus, the minister's memorandum asks the person responsible for placement to immediately draw up a detailed report when the job offer is refused, and to transmit this report directly to Inspection [division]. This is a shortened and thus more rapid procedure.

In the third place, Mr De Wulf opens the "hunt" on "schemes." A certain number of the unemployed attain precisely the number of working days demanded in order to have the right to unemployment benefits. Here we may have a first "scheme" the minister intends to foil, and in relation to which a report has been ordered so as to avoid frauds. (Let us recall nevertheless that judicial doctrine states, on this subject, that there is fraud only to the extent that there is deceitful connivance to evade legal obligations, but that in no way can the fact of placing oneself in the conditions required by law for receiving benefits be held suspect. [punctuation as published])

It appeared next, still under the heading of "schemes," that the last pay-check, the one used for calculating unemployment benefits, is sometimes clearly higher than its predecessors, which leads to an increase in unemployment benefits. On the basis of the recommendations which will be submitted to him, the labor minister will propose a different method of calculating [benefits], which could for example take into account the most recent 6 months of wages. Here, again, it is not a question of decreasing unemployment benefits, but rather of attacking cheating. Finally, the right to benefits as head of family would be examined more closely: a scheme could also slip into this concept, through "forgetting" to give notification of the departure of this concept, through "forgetting" to give notification of the departure [from the household] of a dependent child, which would enable the head of the household, in that capacity, to keep a higher level of benefits than that to which he would normally be entitled.

Moving Cases Faster

The second kind of measure is of a legal nature: up to now, O.N.E.m. was not represented by an attorney in the majority of suits tried in inferior court. This will no longer be the case, the labor minister says. In the same spirit, official reports alleging violations by certain unemployed persons will be sent directly to the Office of Labor Audits, and no more to superiors in the hierarchy who up to now have sorted them out. The audits office itself will now decide whether further action should or should not be considered.

Finally, in a third kind of recommendation, Mr De Wulf intends to make the strictness of his administration uniform, in order to put all jobless persons of an equal footing. Thus, the obligation to show up every day which appears to be applied less rigorously by certain communities, which would accept an appearance every other day, must now be respected. If, on the other hand, the labor inspector files away a complaint from one of his collaborators who has observed a violation and demands sanctions, he will be obliged to justify his decision, all the while keeping the file available for the general directorate.

Sanctions and Authorizations

Equity was also demanded in sanctions or authorizations issued by the regional bureaus. Henceforth, O.N.E.m. officials must interpret the new administrative measures uniformly, and give out fewer waivers of "appearances," authorizing them only to those who demonstrate a real incapacity [to show up].

The special objective of all these measures is basically to flush out the "cheaters" and "schemers" of all kinds who operate on the fringes of legality or beyond them, Mr De Wulf declares. They are part of a more general framework of economies in the social sector.

In another sense, it is also a question of reasserting the minister's authority over his bureaucracy and of better protecting the real jobless from unjust criticism.

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CSO: 3100

DESMARETS CUTS TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 9/10 Aug 80 p 3

[Article]

[Text] Commenting on his budget for 1980, Mr Desmarets, minister of planning and scientific policy, noted that the overall total in the national budget plan for science policy is rising to 43.9 billion, of which 20.5 billion covers the operation of 17 university establishments. Presently, Francophone institutions get more than 52 percent of these allocations, and the distribution by communities must gradually be brought to 55 percent for Dutch-speaking institutions [Flemish?] and 45 percent for Francophone institutions.

The report of the committee on cultural affairs and science policy explained the initial imbalance by the higher number of foreign students in the Francophone universities and by the marked preference of Francophone students for the more costly studies: the exact sciences and medicine, as well as by the free university network which is more advanced, older, and which bears a heavier financial burden.

The minister stressed the critical importance of the contribution science policy makes to efforts at industrial relocation and export development, for the balance of payments deficit grows heavier from each year to the next. Mr Desmarets hopes to be able to "remove the fat" somewhat from [the field of] nuclear research, in order to liberate the funds necessary for financing the research and development activities set down in the government's program of economies in energy and raw materials. When whole sections of our national industries (steelmaking, textiles, machine-building, ship-building, glasswork, etc.) seem to be foundering, only specialization and industrial diversification, as well as the profits that one can expect to be made from commercial sales of new products, seem adequate to turn the tide, according to the minister, who cites, among the new technologies to be developed, coal gasification, urban heating, geo-thermal energy, solar energy, and heat pumps. A working group has been named for micro-electronics. Technologies based on biological processes (enzyme, cellular, and microbiological processes) also seem to offer substantial possibilities.

9516

CSO: 3100

BRUSSELS' FLEMISH POPULATION PLANS OCTOBER CONGRESS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by G. Dt.--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] On next 25 October at the "Ancienne Belgique" ["Old Belgium"] (the name is very significant) the second congress of Flemish Brusselites will be held. This will be an important event in the context of the discussions on the future of Brussels that should begin in the fall. The congress will not be concluded by the "Vlaamse Leeuw" [Flemish lion] but by a recital of Brussels songs interpreted by Johan Verminnen. Does this mean that Flemish Brusselites consider themselves more as Brusselites than as Flemish? Have the Flemish political parties not neglected Brussels in favor of Flanders? What "guarantees" do the Flemish people of Brussels demand?

These are some of the questions which we posed to the president of the congress, Mrs Uyttebroek

In 1975 the Flemish of Brussels held their first congress. It was not only to prepare a list of grievances for the "picked-on Flemish" but also to reflect on what it meant to live in Brussels: economic decline, anarchic urbanism, poor integration of foreigners, etc. Historical footnotes will mention that it was here that for the first time was introduced the notion of "personalizable matters" which has had the fruitful career with which we are all familiar.

One other consequence of this congress was the establishment of separate Flemish lists in the communal elections of 1976. They allowed the Flemish to be better represented in the communal councils.

Since then, the economic and social position of Brussels has continued to deteriorate, and community passions have continued to run wild. "The Egmond pact was the great shock. It was treason. We could not admit the

right of inscription for French-speakers on the periphery, and the setting on an equal footing of Flemish Brusselites and French-speakers on the periphery. Brussels is also our city. The Flemish of Brussels protested massively against the Egmont pact."

This betrayal of the Flemish political parties left traces. An article from the review put out for the next congress is titled: "Up with Flanders! Down with Brussels?"

In September 1979, the decision was made to organize a second congress of the Flemish of Brussels.

Stopping Francification

The initiative comes from the network of 22 Flemish socio-cultural councils established in all the communes and from the many Flemish Brusselite associations. In Brussels, the Flemish are represented less by the political parties than by all these socio-cultural associations created at the initiative of the Flemish community ministers since 1970. "Former minister Mr Van Mechelen, for example, made tremendous efforts to create this cultural web that could mitigate the 'franquillonne' [translation unknown] policy of the communal authorities and help to stop the francification of the Flemish in Brussels." These cultural centers have given back to the Flemish the sense of belonging to a community."

The organization of the congress is pluralist, a rare event in Flanders, and independent of political parties. Since September, more than 600 people have worked on preparations in the 13 working groups. Twelve of them are "nonlinguistic" and are assigned to study the enormous problems posed in Brussels. Concrete proposals will be made, such as the right of foreigners to vote after 5 years of residence in Belgium.

But it is quite obvious that it will be the conclusions of the "political" group which will be most attentively awaited. The working group has delivered a first report, and its conclusions are certainly very close to those which will be adopted next 25 October.

For or Against a Ghetto

The main points of this report concern the participation of the Flemish in communal administration, the question of "sub-nationality," the merger of communes, and the problem of "cultural and personalizable" matters.

Two groups have been in opposition during the preparatory work for the congress. The first considers itself as tied to Brussels as to Flanders, and believes that the city's charm lies in the fact that two cultures exist side by side there. They are against separation between the Flemish and French-speakers in Brussels. "No ghetto!"

The second group calls itself embittered by the negative experience of Flemish Brusselites and sees complete separation of the two communities as the only hope.

This opposition was particularly clear when the problem of "sub-nationality" was broached. Should one have to inscribe on his identity card the community in which he resides? No agreement could be obtained on this point.

The biggest demand of the Flemish in Brussels is /participation in communal administration./ "The communal councils are monopolized by the French-speakers." The congress will ask that at least one-third of the seats on the communal council be reserved to the Flemish, and that they have voting parity. The two communities would separately and in a sovereign manner administer cultural and personalizable matters at the communal level.

"The French-speakers will cry scandal, but this is the only way to correct the dictatorship of the majority. We cannot be content with cultural autonomy. The French-speaking majority commune, for example, could refuse us permission to build a Flemish cultural center. There is no clean distinction between the cultural and the regional."

A Boomerang Law

"We should not content ourselves with little cultural cages while our whole environment is deteriorating and the communes of Brussels are heading toward bankruptcy." The Flemish Brusselites want to participate in the administration of the communes and not to be doomed to remain to the end of time in opposition and without power.

"What we are seeking in Brussels at the communal level is the counterpart of what the French-speakers have obtained at the national level: parity in the executive."

Concerning the merger of communes, a small majority has come out for merger into just one commune. The minority favoring the merger of 19 communes into 6 communes. "Merger is necessary to achieve a better balance between the rich and poor communes."

The right of each community to administer cultural and personalizable questions is an old Flemish demand, but the Flemish of Brussels are beginning to ask themselves if this would after all be such an advance. The communities have to choose as regards a number of cultural associations (libraries, swimming pools, athletic centers) between the enactments of the Flemish and French-speaking cultural councils. They have chosen the second, with the result that the Flemish have been excluded from these cultural associations. "We fear that the same thing is happening with personalizable matters. Without even speaking of conflicts between the national law and the communal decrees. There will be conflict between different [pieces of] legislation, and we fear that this will create new discrimination."

On 25 October, the congress will conclude with a great festivity. It will certainly be easier to dance there than to march into the jungle of communal legislation.

REGIONALIZATION: ULTIMATE CONTROL LIES WITH STATE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 21 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Yves de Wasseige, Walloon Assembly senator: "A Nationalist Regionalism")]

[Text]The regionalization laws that have just been voted in by a majority of the government that regroups the three traditional parties to the exclusion of all others may appear to be the result of a long process by which regions and communities have been affirmed within the State. In reality, the result of this process was attained through the revision of the 1970 constitution. The latter established the autonomy of the two communities with respect to cultural matters and the autonomy of the three regions, principally in economic and social spheres, which a special law was to define.

The 1971 law created community organizations and defined their spheres of competence. On the other hand, in the case of the regions, one has witnessed a slow degradation of the federalist ideas that had brought the movement to this revision of the constitution. But for 10 years the vacuum created by the absence of a law to give definite form to the application of the famed "quater" article 107 of the constitution has been, as it were, the concern of all the governments, especially since 1974, the year that for the first time marks the entry into the government of a regionalist party, the Walloon assembly, and the immediate vote on a provisional regionalization law.

The laws that the three traditional parties have just voted in, under known conditions and to which it will doubtless be necessary to return some day, have the essential characteristic of filling the vacuum of the "quater" 107 without risk for the State, without risk also for the traditional parties, since the State remains in complete control and since the proportional strength of the parties thus also remains unchanged, their localization continuing to be the Belgian State.

The State in control? Why, certainly! First of all, the matters that have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the regions are not any more extensive than those in the provisional regionalization; but this time it is a question of a definitive situation. Next, in particular, in all matters transferred to the regions, without any exception, the State has clearly kept for itself certain determinative aspects. Some examples. The region is responsible for the availability of drinking water and water level control. The water level is the minimum water level of a navigable river. But the construction of dams and their management rest with the State. That means that the installations themselves will be under the control of the State with respect to technical maintenance and under the control of the region when it is a question of operating them for the water supply or for water level maintenance. The rivers and navigable canals will be under the complete control of the State, but the region must attend to water level control. Everyone knows that the latter is controlled by dams and pumps, but it is the State that is in charge of this. The purification of water that is used is a regional matter, but standards, tariffs, and subsidies to enterprises remain within the jurisdiction of the State. Now, then, can the regions operate? Tell me what there is in a policy concerning water that is used beyond standards, tariffs, and subventions? Almost nothing, except the execution of decisions made by the State. It is the same for each of the questions.

Desirous of cultural autonomy, the Flemish community has attained this since 1971. Wallonia, on the other hand, confronted for 30 years with the necessity of reconverting its production apparatus, has remained, and still is, the chief applicant for that regionalization. Will it now have sufficient tools and jurisdiction? The answer, alas, is much more in the negative than in the affirmative.

Of course the regional aspects of credit are within its jurisdiction, but 10 days after having passed this law, parliament passed a budgetary law which creates a national public bank: on the one hand, one regionalizes jurisdictions; on the other, one nationalizes the tools by means of which they could exercise them. Regional economic expansion is an exclusively regional matter, it is true.

But the same budgetary law creates a national secretariat to discuss sectorial planning; it will be able to intervene in all problems regarding the reorganization and restructuring of all industrial sectors and grants (national) funds for industrial renovation amounting to approximately 3 billion francs.

Once again, one regionalizes jurisdictions and one nationalizes tools, even before the regions have been able to make use of their jurisdictions.

Finally, so-called personal matters, that is, all social aid and all health care, have passed on to community authority, thus depriving the regions of the social aspect of the policy that they could have implemented.

What will the future be? For still some years to come, a struggle within the very framework of the voted laws, for Wallonia to have tools and institutions that are suitable for its needs: an administration that it still does not have, some regional semi-public institutions within the spheres of its jurisdiction--like housing, water, land management, economic expansion, research applied to its own affairs. All of that still rests with the State and their restructuration on a regional basis obviously depends on the Flemish partner.

No, truly, these laws are not effective; it is still necessary to fight for the means to implement the jurisdictions. Within the sphere of means, the State has also reserved for itself the strongest possible control: financial means. In actual fact, the regions have no fiscal laws of their own. They will exist on grants voted by the State, in short, by a Flemish majority. Today, the amounts are fixed and the rates of increase determined, but it is none the less true that the budgets are to be voted on each year and that consequently everything can always be called in question.

Thus created, the regions have been sentenced to imprisonment. This is precisely the destiny that has been allotted to them and the freedom that remains to them is that of a common law prisoner. As a matter of fact, only Wallonia is the prisoner of a State where it no longer is recognized, because Flanders is in control of the State apparatus and of authority because of its majority.

The lot of Wallonia is that of a tributary entity to a Belgian State. One now knows, and this is supported by statistics, that it does not have its share. It contributes 30 percent to taxes, but its public authority amounts to 20 percent. The infrastructures favor Flanders: a splendid port policy, 30 percent of which is at the expense of Wallonia, with no corresponding economic fall-out; twice as many auto routes in the north as in the south; a large sectional canal between Havre and Tournai, but blocked at both ends and useless. One Sabena and one Regie of the maritime transports that clearly favor the Flemish region. The list can be lengthened.

The traditional parties that have voted for this regionalization are well suited to their name. Everything has been done in order to not "take risks, to permit supervision, and to make it possible to turn back. It is as if they did not believe in this regionalization to which they were obliged to proceed. But that is perhaps the biggest risk that they took, perhaps without being aware of it. Because, in order to avoid the worst, according to them, they have organized complication and interpenetration of jurisdictions, and they have created continuing conflictive situations.

Henceforth, neither in the Belgian State, nor in Wallonia, will one be able to devote time to studying and to resolving problems. One will have to spend time in examining who is going to resolve them, who will attend to what, each of course remaining jealous of its jurisdictions, and everything will continue to take place in an atmosphere of distrust.

But is there another way out? Of course. It has already been explained on numerous occasions. It asks that one believe first in the regions and their capability and then to organize a life in common within the framework of a State. This is a completely different perspective from that of conceding bits of power, over which the State moreover retains direct or indirect supervision, to regions regarded as a minor child or a common law prisoner.

The future will some day tell us how the prisoner will have found freedom: will the prisoner have been freed or have escaped? One thing is certain--Wallonia cannot accept imprisonment.

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CSO: 3100

PORTRAIT OF OTTO STEENHOLDT, GREENLAND PRO-DANISH PARTY CHAIRMAN

Stockholm NORDISK KONTAKT in Danish No 10, 1980 pp 711-712

[Article: "Portrait - Otto Steenholdt"]

[Text] The Greenlander Otto Steenholdt is one of the politicians who has left his mark on the political debates and the political development in Greenland during the recent years. In the future he will also be known in Nordic circles, where today he has a seat on the cultural selection committee of the Nordic Council.

Steenholdt, who is 43, was born in the north Greenlandic settlement of K'eqertarssuatsiaq approximately 200 km north of the Arctic Circle. He is the son of a seal catcher, Filemon Steenholdt, and was brought up in the 1,000-year-old Greenlandic occupation, sealing. He later received a teacher's diploma in Denmark, where his first interest in politics began.

Today he is a member of the more than 1-year-old Greenlandic home rule parliamentary assembly, Greenland's Landsting; and since 1977 he has also been a member of the Danish Folketing on one of the two Greenlandic mandates. As a result of cooperation with the social democratic Folketing group, he got a seat on the cultural selection committee of the Nordic Council in the fall of 1979.

With these positions in Greenlandic, Danish and Nordic politics, Steenholdt has good possibilities to exert political influence, and he will know how to utilize those possibilities.

In connection with Greenland he is a member of the political movement Atassut ["Mutual Cooperation"], which he himself describes as "socialist-liberal"; and he is considered as one of the leading opposition politicians in the Greenlandic Landsting, where the socialistic-oriented party Siumut ["Forward"] has the majority. Steenholdt favors strengthening the solidarity with Denmark, and at the same time improving the home rule. He is in favor of mixed economy, where private enterprise, companies and cooperatives get the same opportunities to create the many

new jobs, which are so badly needed in unemployment-plagued Greenland. He does not think that the fishing alone can support the country's economy. He, therefore, favors utilizing Greenland's other resources, for example, uranium, if it is possible without endangering people and the environment and with the aim that next year Greenland will be able to handle its own economy and will not have to "continue to beg from Denmark."

A substantial subject of debate in Greenlandic politics is the membership in EF, which now is effective through common statehood with Denmark. When Denmark became a member of EF by referendum in 1972, more than 70 percent of the Greenlandic votes were against joining. During the election to the EF-parliament this year, the number of opposing votes, however, was reduced. Steenholdt is inclined to ascribe this reduction partly to his party, Atassut. Steenholdt's viewpoint is that until now Greenland has benefited from the membership--and as long as that is the case, we will maintain the association with EF, says Steenholdt. Nevertheless he welcomes the planned referendum regarding Greenland's future relations with EF. This referendum will take place in 1982.

Steenholdt's principle in Danish politics is that he votes in the Folketinget with Atassut's political platform as basis; and in accordance with his own conscience; and, moreover, he wants to perform on par with all the other members. After the referendum on 23 October 1979 he initiated what he calls "technical election" cooperation with the Social Democratic Party, in whose parliamentary group he has status as an observer. "I feel most comfortable in the middle of Danish politics, my first sympathy going to the Social Democratic Party," he says.

Steenholdt's involvement in political work in the Nordic circles began in the fall of 1979, when the Social Democratic Party gave Steenholdt one of its mandates in the Nordic Council.

Steenholdt admits that the culture and history of the Greenlandic people is far removed from the traditions of the Nordic countries. But he thinks that both Greenland and the Nordic countries can find closer cooperation especially valuable, perhaps just because of these differences. He is one of the Greenlandic politicians who clearly wishes Greenland to receive independent status in the Nordic Council, on par with the actual member countries. He maintained this point of view most recently during the Nordic Council's session held in Iceland.

"But if it, for one reason or another, proves impossible to secure independent status for Greenland, then I will be happy if the rules and decrees effective in Nordic cooperation today, are extended to include Greenland as well. This happens not to be the case in all areas today, and I think it is most regrettable. Greenland, after all, continues to be a part of the Danish Kingdom, and as such should be assured all membership rights," says Steenholdt.



OTTO STEENHOLDT

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LOCAL OFFICIAL CITES NEED TO CUT BUDGET OUTLAYS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Kai Aage Ornskov, deputy mayor of Lyngby-Taarbaek]

[Text] Whether or not one thinks this country has a good and sensible government (and personally I feel there are many indications that we now have one of the poorest governments in modern times) one has to admit that the recommendation to halt growth in public budgets is very well-founded. It should be obvious to everyone that public budgets have reached such a high level that continued growth in this sector can not be borne by society and the taxpayer.

And there is good reason for advising municipalities to halt growth in municipal budgets too.

Through the 1970's there was rapid growth in both national and municipal budgets. The growth can be illustrated by giving the percentage of national and municipal budgets with regard to the Gross National Product in 1970 and in 1980.

During this period many obligations have passed from the state to the county or local community as a result of municipal reform and many so-called savings on the national level were achieved by the government and Folketing by reducing state reimbursements for municipal activities and therefore it is impossible to separate growth in the two (state and local) systems.

However, public spending in terms of the Gross National Product grew from 43 percent in 1970 to 54 percent in 1980. Public employee levels in the same period increased by around 200,000 jobs.

Taxation in the same period has not grown as rapidly as spending and that is why there have been sizable deficits in public budgets lately--deficits that had a lot to do with our present foreign exchange balance problems and the need to borrow money abroad.

Incidentally it is interesting to note that the entire deficit in public finances (12 billion kroner in 1980) can be assigned to the national budget while municipal budgets are balanced between income and outlay.

Municipal budgets for 1979 show a total real growth of 6 percent compared with 1978 while growth from 1979 to 1980, following the government recommendations in the summer of 1979, was limited to around 3 percent.

But all public balance sheets show that in preparing budgets for 1980 the adjustments were made in capital investment areas. It was the investment budgets that were slashed. Operating budgets continued to climb. In 1980 growth in operating budgets alone was 15 percent.

Thus when 1981 municipal budgets are prepared after the summer vacation for approval by 1 October the problem will be to check growth in operating budgets. In most places investment budgets were cut back so sharply last year that no more can be obtained there--on the contrary, some may have postponed the problems from 1980 to 1981.

There is no doubt about it, we have to work on the operating budgets now.

In recent years we have heard and read time after time statements in the debate on the justification of implementing savings. The idea of "slashing spending" is often mentioned. But when we look at the course of events over the last 10 years savings have not actually been made. In most areas--on both the national and municipal levels--real budget growth has occurred. One can therefore ask why it is that some people believed that savings had been made--unreasonable savings, even--since in reality the very opposite is true.

To understand the problems encountered here it might be helpful to know how many budget talks occur.

Department managers--and this is true of both state and local budgets--work out budget drafts by projecting the costs of operating present and planned activities, often adding in desired activities as well.

The National Association of Municipalities prepares and sends out to local members estimates over anticipated price and cost increases, estimates of anticipated wage increases and anticipated developments in the tax base. This is all well and good. The figures are used in preparing budget drafts. But time after time the result is that the preliminary budgets are too high and the politicians have to start cutting them. They have to come up with 10, 15, 25 or 50 million kroner or even more and this is a problem politicians run into in one budget debate after another.

A budget projection made on the basis of anticipated operating and investment costs will almost inevitably lead to budgets that are too expensive.

In practice there are only three things politicians can do about budgets that are too expensive:

They can raise more money in taxes and thus cover the expenses requested by department managers.

They can finance their activities through loans.

Or they can find savings that will balance the budget.

Of course it is natural to start out by looking at new investment plans. If funds are short one doesn't start up new activities unless they are strictly necessary. That is why it has generally been investment spending that has been cut when savings had to be made while growth has continued on the operating side.

The question I find it natural to ask in this situation is whether it is acceptable to continue making budget projections on the basis of anticipated spending. Shouldn't we change this and write budgets on the basis of anticipated revenues? In other words, prepare budgets on the assumption that one has to make do with the funds that can be anticipated at a given tax percentage and anticipated taxpayer income. That is what should be done in my opinion.

That would lead to budget projections that would be much more in line with what society and the taxpayers can bear.

Some may object that this method might prevent the starting up of new activities or the cancellation of present ones. But if so these problems should be part of the budget debate and consideration should be given to the idea of raising more funds through taxes or by making cuts in other areas.

There is no doubt that if one starts with what is affordable with a reasonable tax rate it will be much more possible to force individual areas or sectors to make realistic priorities with regard to what needs to be done. Thus if one wants to start something new, which is a real need in a dynamic society, one must reduce activities that may no longer be quite as justified as they were when they were started. There is little doubt that the way in which we have prepared budgets up to now has not given much incentive to a truly critical reevaluation of activities that had already become established.

Anyone who has anything to do with public budgets should become aware that the public sector should evaluate its consumption of resources as closely as ever and show restraint in order to make room for the expansion in the business sector which is the only way out of the problem with which our society is now confronted.

ECONOMIC EXPERTS FORECAST CONTINUED RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 Aug 80 p 15

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] There will be 250,000 more employees in the public sector by the year 2020 when there will also be a sharp decline in jobs in the agricultural and building sectors.

That is the picture drawn by the economic experts in a supplemental report to their June report which has just been issued.

The new supplemental report contains detailed information on the calculations on the Danish economy 40 years in the future which were mentioned briefly in the latest expert report in connection with estimates of the influence of energy prices on the future Danish economy. The new supplemental report released by the economists is entitled "Energy in a Multisector Growth Model for Denmark" and the figures in the report indicate a great change in Denmark's economic structure.

The economic experts have made their long-range calculations on the basis of a so-called MSGE (Multi Sectoral Growth, Energy) model of the Danish economy and it is emphasized that this is not a real forecast of probable developments 40 years in the future but a calculation example based on many assumptions. But these assumptions are not unrelated to reality, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE was told at the economic experts' secretariat in Copenhagen.

Fifty Percent Increase

Among other things the economic experts assume that public consumption in the future will grow only half as much as private consumption. In spite of this the calculations show that the public sector will grow from 500,000 full-time employees (in 1979) to around 750,000 full-time employees in the year 2020. While the public sector hired 19.2 percent of all employees in 1973--and around 23 percent in 1979--

almost 31 percent of the total labor force will work in the public sector in the year 2020, as the table below shows.

This growth in the public sector means that the entire net addition to the labor market in the next 40 years, 125,000 people (on a full-time basis), will be absorbed by the public sector which will also use 125,000 people who are currently unemployed. While the public sector expands employment by a quarter of a million jobs, representing a 50 percent increase, it is expected that employment in the private sector as a whole will remain unchanged.

The economic experts point out that this result must be viewed in light of an assumption that job productivity in the public sector cannot be increased. Thus an increase in public consumption can be accomplished only if more people are employed.

Business Downturn

How the calculations turn Denmark's economic structure inside out over the next four decades can be seen in the table where job distribution by branch is shown for 1973 and as estimated for 2020.

Aside from the massive advance of the public sector what meets the eye are the sharp labor cuts forecast for agriculture, the construction sector and portions of industry. The relative share of employment in agriculture and construction will be cut almost in half.

The economic experts write in their new supplemental report that the decline for agriculture and the food and beverage industry will be due primarily to a low income elasticity for food consumption, in other words it is assumed that people will use a very small part of an income hike for these products. The relative decline for the chemical industry is based on an assumed sharp increase in production per worker in this sector. The downturn in the stone, clay and glass industries must be seen in light of developments in the construction sector, the economic experts point out. The relative decline in the fuel sector is based partly on assumptions that energy prices will rise twice as rapidly as other prices in the next 40 years. That means automatic savings here.

Tax Pressures

The Economic Council experts write that it is hard to say anything definite about developing tax pressures while it is easier to anticipate how spending pressures will develop. Spending pressures indicate public spending for the purchase of goods and services as a percentage of the national product. In 1979 this public spending was around 28 percent of the Gross National Product and according to the supplemental report this figure will rise to 30 percent in 2020.

The economists do not hide the fact that tax pressures will also rise but they note that developments in transfer income (pensions, unemployment compensation, etc.) play an important part here in addition to developments in public spending on goods and services.

The economic structure of Denmark in the years 1973 and 2020 is shown in this table. The source is "Energy in a Multisector Growth Model for Denmark," a supplement to the June 1980 Economic Council report. The distribution of full-time employees is shown in percentages.

	1973	2020
Agriculture	10.5 %	6.0 %
Food and beverage sector	4.7	3.3
Clothing, wood, paper	6.9	3.7
Chemical industry	1.8	0.8
Stone, clay and glass industry	1.6	0.8
Other manufacturing	11.5	10.5
Water and renovation	0.2	0.3
Trade	13.7	13.8
Transportation	5.3	8.8
Private services, etc.	14.6	15.1
Housing usage	0.4	0.5
Construction sector	9.0	5.3
Electricity	0.5	0.3
Fuel	0.1	0.0
Public services	19.2	30.8
Total	100 %	100 %

6578

CSO: 3106

PSF'S MITTERRAND GIVES POLITICAL VIEWS IN INTERVIEW

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jul 80 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Francois Mitterrand, Socialist Party first secretary, by Michel Tatu on 30 July]

[Text] At the very moment when Brezhnev in Moscow was celebrating the fifth anniversary of the signing of the final draft of the Helsinki Conference by asking, in a statement to PRAVDA, that 30 July become the Day of Europe, Mitterrand devoted himself, in a conversation with Michel Tatu, the full report of which follows, to a grand overview of international relations and, in particular, of security problems in Europe.

The first secretary of the French Socialist Party (PS) considers it "urgent and necessary" to re-examine relationships within the Atlantic alliance of which "no one knows where it stands" nor what the obligations of its members are. In particular Mitterrand sees a basic inconsistency between France's defense policy, founded upon making the country a sanctuary, and a strategy of alliance, the former in the long run capable of "tempting the French to a kind of neutrality. "If we refuse any solidarity with allies, he asks specifically, "how could we expect theirs?"

Further, Mitterrand considers that the American policy has "lost all continuity" and that the Atlantic strategy of graduated response "makes no sense: where the Soviets, by means of their SS-20 missiles, can destroy "all European military apparatus" in a quarter of an hour. He demands that the Soviets and communists recognize that this missile is "intolerable to the French" and declare themselves in favor of negotiating this matter.

While emphasizing the necessity for friendship between France and the USSR, he states that "friendship is not based upon accommodation" and demands that the Afghan resistance be recognized.

[Question] What is the main criticism you have of the government's foreign policy?

[Answer] We have a foreign policy which strives above all else to please the one to whom we are talking at the moment, and all the more so if that one is powerful, whenever it is not simply a question of pleasing French opinion. It is a policy devoid of general ideas except one: conform to the occasion. I am not making a case against realism. But realism does not necessarily consist of choosing the immediate present over the future and being subject from day to day to the rule of events. Whether it be the Middle East, the Near East, the European Community, the Third World, or relations with the USSR and the United States that is the way things are going.

[Question] What is your opinion on the Warsaw meeting between Giscard d'Estaing and Brezhnev?

[Answer] My viewpoint is that, at a time of serious tension, at the moment when destiny is hanging in the balance, anything which contributes however little to strengthening the position of the aggressor is a mistake. I therefore consider the trip to Warsaw a mistake. I cannot grasp in what way France's step can lend any element of solution to the Afghanistan problem, hasten the departure of the Soviets, or open negotiations. We have at our disposal no means of altering, for the benefit of peace, the existing ratio of forces.

[Question] What indeed must be done to help the Afghans?

[Answer] The USSR has to take account of a number of facts upon which others may act. For example, after the Kabul coup it found itself confronted by the hostile bloc of Islamic countries - even though that block is split, faced with an overwhelming vote in the U.N. where, for the first time the majority of Third World countries condemned a Russian step, and faced with the accelerating rapprochement - which it fears - of the United States and China. What is more it has taken a great risk as far as the Olympic games are concerned and has endangered the two major negotiations of the Brezhnev regime - SALT 2 and the grand successor of the Helsinki Conference next November in Madrid. Last, let us not forget the tenacious, and undoubtedly unforeseen, resistance of the Afghan people.

Returning to the Warsaw Meeting, what Giscard d'Estaing had to say, what he perhaps did say to Brezhnev is less important - what am I saying - is of no importance in comparison with the action which consisted [words illegible] and to the significance which this meeting took on. Last, the president of the republic has for long hesitated to affirm the right: the right of peoples to control their own destinies, the rights of man. Uttered after 15 days delay the word "unacceptable" was interpreted by the Russians as...accepted.

In days gone by Stalin asked, speaking disdainfully of the pope, how many divisions he had. I believe that Stalin on that day said a stupid thing. Of course, we know the value of armed might but there are also invisible forces which weigh heavily. I believe in the existence of universal conscience. Whoever strives to awaken it will one day be heard. It would be the end of

all civilization if the conscience of man were irretrievably to the primitive impulses of power and blood. No doubt the right is losing many battles. But in the end it will win if it remains steadfast, whence the importance of the struggle for human rights.

A single witness without fear is sufficient for expression and therefore to raise the hopes of the world. I know, France must beware of being presumptuous and behaving as a teacher of lessons. But I am sure that the simple reminder, through its voice, of the principles upon which there can be no compromise, would be heard around the planet. Last, I believe that if the Soviets perceive a greater cohesiveness in what is called the occident, a greater cohesiveness in what is called Europe, it would be something for them to think about, and favorable for opening negotiations.

[Question] Is such negotiation possible?

[Answer] It cannot be said that the Russians have put it completely aside. First, because of the difficulties they are encountering, it is difficult for them to turn a deaf ear. If you analyze the various proposals put forth up to the present, the Cuban, the Indian, the "Afghan," and the European, all revolve around the idea of evacuation from Afghanistan under international guarantees and adoption of neutrality. There is a basis for negotiations and I believe it would be necessary to point toward a solution of this nature. But this cannot take place while there is denial of rights. Anything that would allow it to be understood that such a solution implies advance recognition of the legitimacy of the Karmal regime or one of foreign nature must be eliminated. It is up to the Afghan people to decide for themselves on full freedom. I would like to add that when the president of the Republic of France, in a press conference, allowed the words "Afghan rebels" to slip out in speaking of the resistance by that people, he provides an excuse for the Soviet Union to bring into play negotiations based upon recognition of the present regime.

"Recognize the Afghan Resistance"

[Question] Giscard d'Estaing has said that France will not provide military aid to this resistance. What is your opinion on that?

[Answer] The Vietnamese resistance was recognized by many countries. Why should not the Afghan resistance be recognized? I recently stated that in the absence of a Soviet withdrawal such recognition is imperative.

[Question] Recognized, therefore aided?

[Answer] It is indeed helping it a great deal by recognizing it.

[Question] Do you believe that economic pressures can be used?

[Answer] I accept technological sanctions and I reject food sanctions which, incidentally, are more often than not ineffective. The grains which the Soviet Union purchases are not intended for direct human consumption but for cattle,

which in turn will feed man. Between those operations much time passes during which other countries can be canvassed. And, then there is in that way of doing things something which offends me morally. On the other hand technological sanctions consist of saying: you are acting contrary to the right, against peace, you are moving forward the time of world war; I have no reason to deliver to you the means for doing more of that more quickly. I find that response legitimate.

[Question] It is not always effective, especially if the European countries supply what the Americans refuse.

"What a Mess"

[Answer] Certainly. This inconsistency proves that there is no Atlantic Alliance, or more precisely, that it no longer has any meaning. Reexamination of the relations which unite the countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance to me appears urgent and necessary. I have said, and I repeat, that if any summit is imperative, it is indeed that one. Because I have proposed that summit L'HUMANITE has marked me an "Atlantiste." This made me laugh...and must have astonished the Americans! What indeed do the French communist leaders mean when they give assurances that they do not want France to leave the Atlantic Alliance? Because it serves no purpose? The Italian and Spanish Communists have likewise affirmed their desire to remain in the alliance.

That Afghanistan and the entire Middle East not be covered by this alliance arises from obvious political and geographical facts. But all the same, what a mess! Look at Great Britain which is renewing its contracts with Iran and even increasing them at the same time as it is joining in the planned economic sanctions against that country! Look at West Germany which is concluding new economic and technological agreements with Soviet Russia at the very time that Carter is intending to freeze relations with Moscow! And let us not talk about France!

Let me be included. The Americans are in large part responsible, Carter is wrong, as he is doing, to mix election considerations with problems of world peace and to decide upon everything without consulting those whom he is committing or whom he believes he is committing. But, as far as I am concerned, I consider that I have to alert opinion to the disarray in western strategy, if we can call it strategy. See here, when the Seven (six western countries plus Japan) met at Venice in June. At the end of their meetings they published a harmonious and optimistic communique, or which was, in any event, interpreted as such. One could believe that at least upon the subject of Afghanistan, the essential one of their conversations, the Seven were in agreement. Very well - the next day Carter was talking of the evacuation of Soviet troops in stages and the day after that Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who at Warsaw had suggested a calendar for evacuation, stated the contrary! Upon what did Carter and Giscard agree? Upon nothing.

I believe it was Hua Guafeng who said that there was only one superpower in the world, the Soviet Union. That is excessive. But it is obvious that,

since it was engaged in the Vietnamese War, American policy has lost all continuity. A sort of whirlpool has taken hold of that country which, in spite of its vitality and creative capabilities, is piling up reasons for self-doubt. It must be acknowledged that its interventions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Latin America have, in the true meaning of the word, demoralized it. The Soviet Union has not experienced such soul searching.

"Nobody Knows Where the Alliance Now Stands"

[Question] A return of the United States in force would not disturb you?

[Answer] It all depends upon what we are talking about. Up to now our conversation has dealt with the tensions born of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its consequences, and only with that subject. If we leave that problem - I see that the United States has ceaselessly waged economic war against us. The disappearance of the monetary system, the strategy of the multi-national companies, the manipulations of the dollar, and the American desire, relayed by Great Britain, to submerge the common market in a free trade zone, in short, that country's imperialism, require a great deal of vigilance on our part and justify our suspicions.

But we have not yet emerged - even if we so desired - from the situation created by the last world war: when the United States and the USSR agree, their allies count for little. When they do not agree it is even worse. Then, I ask, that at least the occident not lend itself up to a strategy of the Curicattii.

The Atlantic Alliance provides for consultations among partners in case of a threat, that is all. The Brussels treaty says a little more but in truth nobody in the west knows where the alliance stands, its scope, the reciprocal obligations which it includes and the extent to which they are automatic. It is at least necessary that each be aware of to what it agrees and what it rejects and say so squarely to the others. After that, it will be known by what to abide. The alliance is based upon fiction: American intervention in Europe in the event of Soviet aggression.

The Neutron Bomb

[Question] Therefore let us talk about defense. The neutron bomb symbolizes the debate but the real question is to know what France must do for its allies in the event of war in Europe. Is it indeed necessary to prepare for a conventional conflict in Europe or rather does it seem to you that deterrence, making France a sanctuary, should prevail?

[Answer] As you know we socialists reject construction and deployment of the neutron bomb. With the present status of the alliance it is impossible for France to do anything else than assure defense of its own territory by nuclear deterrence. Any sortie away from home would basically contradict that strategy, would involve us in conflicts which we could no longer win, and put us back into a system where we would lose our autonomous power of decision. But this withdrawal back upon itself could in time lead France into a sort of neutralism

with respect to world affairs, and particularly, with respect to our closest friends. If we refuse any solidarity with them how can we expect theirs? Today there is a discrepancy between the strategy based upon solely defending the national sanctuary and the strategy based upon the alliance. Any responsible politician who fears to pose this problem is deceiving the public. Last, I ask that we know what we are talking about. And that we do talk about it.

[Question] Nevertheless does a conventional conflict remain possible?

[Answer] The American thesis of graduated response in my opinion makes no sense. Can you imagine a great country like Soviet Russia, knowing that its adversary is biding time until the first, second, or third warning shot, committing itself to a conflict only to withdraw from it pitifully 48 hours later?

Actually the Soviets can wage only direct and massive war. And they have situated themselves to act thus: their SS-20 [missiles] can in a quarter of an hour destroy in toto the European military apparatus without touching an American city or killing an American soldier, and without moving a Russian soldier beyond its borders.

[Question] What do you conclude from all that?

[Answer] I do not conclude that the Russians want war. I even believe the contrary. But they possess an arsenal which enables them, I daresay, to win a war without waging one. Today it is our duty to pose the serious question of the balance of forces in Europe.

The "Pershing"

[Question] What do you think of the NATO decision to install Pershing rockets and American cruise missiles in Europe?

[Answer] When the communist leaders asked us to demonstrate against the American Pershing [missiles] I told them we were ready to do so if at the same time there was commitment to activity against the Soviet SS-20 [missiles]. I admit that the Pershing [missiles] are intolerable to the Russians. I expect the Russians - and the communist leaders - to understand that the SS-20 [missiles] are intolerable to the French. And I observe that, although the announced installation of Pershing [missiles] in Europe irritates Moscow, the idea of discussing, at the same time, the Pershing [missiles], the SS-20 [missiles] and the rest is making headway. Indeed, let us continue.

Therein is problem number one for peace in Europe. I have been greatly astonished by the silence of the president of the republic on this subject which he seems to ignore or underestimate.

[Question] You preach firmness but nevertheless you came out against boycotting the Olympic Games.

[Answer] Making the athletes the scapegoats in this entire affair had no great significance. Besides, the manner in which Carter proposed it was so election oriented, so much without any joint deliberation that I found it intolerable. And in the same way that I want the Atlantic allies to reexamine their situation, I intended that we be not weak every time the Americans confuse Alliance and imperialism. Besides, you know that the West Germans were so inclined only because the necessity compelled it. Actually they were as shocked as we, if not more, at Carter's unilateral action.

[Question] J.-P. Cheveniment recently wrote an article* in which he stated the Soviet danger was exaggerated, that it is not the principal danger, and that this false fear covers a desire to strengthen the positions of the military-industrial apparatus.

[Answer] Let us not lay this hypothesis aside. But let us not base all our reasoning upon it - that would be imprudent. The desire for peace is demonstrated other than by frantic super-armament! The installation of the SS-20 [missiles] which cannot reach America but only Europe (they cannot travel beyond 4,500 kilometers) constitutes a real danger. But that certain industrial and military circles are adding fuel to the fire is also probable.

[Question] What kind of negotiation with the East do you recommend?

[Answer] Comprehensive negotiations without preconditions. The socialist party is not satisfied with calculating the risks of a conflict and alerting public opinion to the aggravation of those risks at the same time as the public authorities. It reminds everyone that to accumulate weapons, particularly atomic, to increase challenges, to break international law lead to confrontation. How timely it is to reopen negotiations upon sound and honest bases. Whence derives the importance of the Madrid conference where all will be present, for the first time since the Kabul coup, to discuss economics, security, human rights, and the confidence measures necessary for return to détente. Such is the order of the day, and in any event of this conference. And let us not forget all the countries of Europe, of the East and of the West, will be there. Many of them, on either side, will speak the same language in order to establish the conditions for peace.

I also wish that there be put into effect the socialist proposal of a conference for reduction of forces and tensions in Europe, about which I spoke to readers of LE MONDE in December 1977.**

"Friendship With the USSR Should Not Be Based Upon Accommodation"

[Question] Ever since then you seem to have been placing more stress on the responsibility of the Soviets.

*LE MONDE, 12 July 1980

**LE MONDE, 14-15 December 1977

[Answer] Because Afghanistan and the SS-20 [missiles] are pressing realities. Do not see any inconsistency there; I have never ceased believing in the necessity for friendship and good relations between the USSR and France. This, to me, appears indispensable to balance in Europe and I am ready to increase initiatives in this direction. But friendship is not based upon accommodation. The Russians will negotiate with us all the better if they respect us. I mean that they will respect our capability of saying "No" when it is necessary. This will give greater weight to our "Yes."

[Question] What do you think of the present tendency to divide Europe between France and Germany?

[Answer] So much the better for French-German reconciliation which goes back much more than the 20 years which Valéry Giscard d'Estaing generously accorded to it during his recent trip to Germany. For my part, I participated in the First European Congress at The Hague in 1947. But from there to the establishment of a preferential Paris-Bonn axis there is a distance, Europe is the Europe of the nine and assumes thorough equality of the partners. If Great Britain absents itself or moves away from it, that is a pity.

[Question] Was having it come back into Europe a mistake?

[Answer] I think it was a good thing. But the community must hold fast against being submerged in a free trade zone and must be able to resist the British persistence.

Waverings over Europe

[Question] Is the Europe of the nine cohesive enough for that?

[Answer] I fear that it is not.

I must acknowledge that I am disturbed by the decline of community spirit among the nine. It is to be seen in the regulations which have been rescinded and when they have not been they are violated. Unfortunately, France is not the latest to fail to live up to its obligations when, paradoxically, it neglects the provisions for protection which the treaty authorizes. In its European approach the Giscard-Barre government shows the same waverings as in the other areas of its foreign policy. We would not have entered into the "Mutton War" in such unfortunate manner if we had taken, while there was still time, before the end of December 1977, the desirable temporary measures. We would have felt the affront inflicted upon Giscard d'Estaing on the occasion of conceding 15 billion francs to Great Britain less if we had not previously treated that so airily.

It is still but a few days ago that the president of the republic in Germany appealed for European solidarity. Hearing him, I could not refrain from thinking of his refusal to sign the "Seveso" directive relative to the dangers of major accidents resulting from industrial operations, such as the dioxine in that too little town in Northern Italy, a zone it is still forbidden to

enter 4 years after the event. Likewise for pollution of the Rhine, where we have accepted an agreement dangerous to the Alsatian subsoil, then refused to apply it. What fine logic!

I also thought about Giscard d'Estaing's about-face on the widening of the Common Market. He could not be sarcastic enough last year in criticizing the socialist position which demanded negotiating rigorous economic pre-conditions in order to assure our producers of fair competitive conditions. But we had serious arguments going to the very nature of the common market and not to Mrs Thatcher's moods. And we posed the real questions: guaranteed agricultural prices for production and market share; bureaus for wine, fruits and vegetables, and horticulture; alignment of fiscal and social responsibilities and so forth. Is there any explanation of the chief of state's position, for his part, other than election oriented?

I remember having said, "Europe will be socialist or it will not develop." Which means, not negation of a pluralistic Europe, but my doubt that it is possible for liberal economy in Europe to escape its laws which condemn it to be merged into a whole dominated by interests which are not ours. The socialists have provided their answer: The Pisani, Cresson, and Sutra reports, proposals of Jacques Delors, and Yvette Roudy's report on the environment. Our criticisms are not desired to be negative but how can the economy be changed without changing policy?

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CSO: 3100

CORSICAN LEADER SIMEONI QUOTED ON FUTURE PLANS OF UPC

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Aug 80 pp 1, 15

[Article by Jacques-Francois Simon--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[Text] /Two terrorist attacks which only resulted in property damages were made during the night of 9-10 August in Corte. An explosive charge was hurled against one of the entrance-ways of the villa of Mr Gabriel Legrand, a machine engineer. Earlier, bursts of fire from automatic weapons hit a police building.

/These actions have not yet been avenged, but how could it be overlooked that they coincide with the organizing in this sub-prefecture of Upper-Corsica of the congress of the Corsican People's Union (UPC)? This outbreak brought Mr Edmond Simeoni, the main leader of the autonomist movement, to reaffirm his condemnation of violence and to describe the "legal" and "open" action he intends to lead for Corsica to gain internal autonomy./

Corte--The Congress of Corte, the fourth which has brought together the Corsican Peoples Union since its founding, did not draw a great crowd. About 2,000 people (clearly less than were counted at Ajaccio in August 1979) were waiting, under the great pavillion set up in the stadium at the lower end of the city. Above towered the citadel, the symbol of Corsican "resistance" for the leaders of the autonomist movement.

A mixed crowd: many young people, but also whole families waving white flags stamped with the head of a Moor [sic].

They waited patiently and without rowdiness, prepared to listen to sensible talk rather than war talk.

A general assembly of activists had set the tone early in July. The congress would be one of "clarification," of reflection after a year of struggle for autonomy, described in a special issue of ARRITTI, the UPC weekly, in lengthy detail. No surprise, especially after the statements which Mr Edmond Simeoni, the leader of the movement, made to us two days before.

For Corsican autonomism is always best expressed by Edmond Simeoni, with his spontaneous eloquence, ardent, very repetitive, chaotic, but terribly effective. The introduction and the conclusion will be spoken in Corsican, and it is in Corsican that the most important passages, those which will be most applauded, will be underlined and repeated.

At the beginning of the festivities, the autonomist leader goes to the essence of his ideas. /"To misjudge the power of the French colonial state is the mark of dreaming or irresponsibility."/ This state, with the support in Paris of the parties of the right (/ "They are the more vigorous"/) and of the parties of the left (/ "They have proved the more hypocritical"/), and in Corsica of local clans /"based on corruption and prevarication," has developed /"an arsenal of coercion and implacable surrender" [sic]/ which aims at breaking any attempt at the expression of Corsican identity. /"But don't you understand,"/ Edmond Simeoni adds, /"that without institutional overthrow, without revolution, without bombing, one could put an end to the island's demands on language, land ownership, and [vocational] training for youths?"/

The autonomist leader will speak, at length (his speech will last three quarters of an hour) and in detail, on the activity of the parallel police-- /"taking orders from the Elysee"/--on the existence and the attitude of the state security court-- /"it distorts justice by its very nature"/--on the control of news media-- /"the jamming of Radio Corsica International, for example"/--on the imposed decision to build a thermal power plant at Vazzio, on the deliberate determination, finally, to give credence to the "amalgamation" of the legal autonomist movement, that is, UPC, and the clandestine pro-independence movement, that is, the Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), which supports violent action.

Mr Edmond Simeoni demonstrated his intent to separate himself from the FLNC. He does so vigorously, prepared, he says, to be accused of /"reformism"/ and /"weakness"/, but, he adds, /"independence is not credible, because it assumes a victorious armed struggle. This is not possible in Corsica, and the Corsican people reject it. We must listen to the people." (The autonomist leader will be warmly applauded when he praises the /"courage, the selflessness, the abnegation"/ of the FLNC militants, as [he will be] when he declares his support /"with no exceptions"/ for all Corsican political prisoners (there are presently 8 UPC and some 50 FLNC prisoners). He will not be opposed when he adds that he does not for all that want to /"stand good for the actions?" of the pro-independence militants and commit himself with them /"to a suicidal path?" in a venture based on /"a Manichean view of the world and an idealization of the people."/

The objective of the UPC remains, by contrast, a legal action. It is internal autonomy, such as it was defined in the speech which preceded that of Edmond Simeoni, the one given by Mr Lucien Alfonsi, spokesman of the movement. That is to say, a regional assembly elected by universal suffrage, with proportional representation, able to legislate in all domains other than those which touch on national defense, foreign affairs, and currency.

By what means can it be attained? /"We must greatly increase our work of sensitization and reflection,"/ and especially deepen our culture, says Mr Simeoni. It is necessary to continue to try to internationalize the Corsican question and thus appeal to international conscience. The autonomist leader next makes an appeal for openness and tolerance. /"We cannot perpetuate our divisions. Let us try to be Corsicans without being belligerent, let us respect our differences. Let us work with all who want meaningful change. We do not want to dissociate anyone from the struggle."/

Expressions rarely heard from the lips of the leader of the actions in Aleria or Bastelica. Mr Edmond Simeoni will conclude by repeating one of his old proposals: the organization of an institutional referendum. It would not be aimed at preparing the way for self-determination, he says, but /"would be the opportunity"/ for a true democratic confrontation of all sides, wherever they are coming from, in the light of day, and after having had the time to examine the voting lists. This last word was dropped in passing, [but is] more important than would appear when one knows the ravages that voting fraud continues to cause in the island. Decidedly yes, this congress will have borne the clear stamp of realism.

9516

CSO: 3100

MILITARY APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Aug 80 p 6

[Text] On the recommendation of Yvon Bourges, Defense Minister, the council of ministers on Wednesday 6 August 1980 approved the following appointments:

Ground: Appointed commander of the First Army and military governor of Strasbourg, Army Corps Gen Jacques de Barry, replacing Gen of the Army Claude Vanbremeersch, who has been made chief of staff of the armies.

(Born on 18 June 1922 and a former St Cyrian, Jacques de Barry in March 1943 was a member of the Army Resistance Organization (ORA) before being arrested by the Germans in February 1944, interned and deported. After being held in the Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Dachau camps he was released in April 1945.

Among other posts he served in 1951 at staff headquarters of the high commissioner of France in Indochina and commander in chief in the Far East, Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. After several staff headquarters posts and participation in the Algerian war, he was assigned as a colonel to the office of Pierre Messmer, Gen de Gaulle's minister of the armies. He then commanded the Second Mechanized Brigade (1970), the St Cyr School (1972), the Fourth Division (1975), and, raised to the rank and title of army corps general in April 1977, he was appointed in July of that year commander of the First Military Region, commander of the Third Army Corps and military governor of Paris.

The First Army, whose PC [command post] is at Strasbourg, includes 160,000 men in wartime with, principally, eight armored divisions and five Pluto nuclear artillery regiments. Its ~~staff~~ headquarters is responsible for committing them under the direct authority of the chief of staff of the armies and air-ground maneuvers coordination, combined with the tactical air force (FATAC.).

Air: Air Division Gen Elie Humbert has been appointed director of the Air Higher Education Center and the Graduate School of Air Warfare.

8946

CSO: 3100

SURINAME, NETHERLANDS TO RESUME TALKS 14 SEPTEMBER

FL281450 Bridgetown SUNDAY ADVOCATE-NEWS in English 24 Aug 80 p 1

[Excerpt] Paramaribo, Suriname, 23 Aug (CANA)--Development aid talks between Suriname and Holland are scheduled to resume here September 14, when a mixed commission will be meeting, according to Suriname's Prime Minister-President, Dr. Henck Chin-a-sen.

Professor Van Dam, chairman of the commission, has already arrived here to prepare an agenda for the talks, which follow a breakdown in negotiations last July between the past rulers of this former colony and the Suriname Government.

The Suriname members of the mixed commission are Dr. Andre Haakmat, now minister of foreign affairs, justice and police, Dr. Sorojdeoosing, and Dr. R. Ferrier, chairman of the West Suriname Development Project.

Dr. Henck Chin-a-sen said there will be no discussion on "inflation-proof aid," a subject which resulted in the breakdown of discussions between himself and the Dutch development aid minister, Jan de Koning.

Dr. Chin-a-sen expressed optimism at the outcome of the forthcoming talks and described as a "hot love" the relations between Holland and Suriname. He said both Holland and Suriname need each other.

"Holland wants to see Suriname develop so that the 160,000 Surinamers now resident there could return home," he said.

"On the other hand, Suriname was very much in need of foreign aid for the development of the country and it would like to have its nationals return home, especially those with skills to put them at the disposal of the government," Dr. Chin-a-sen said.

CSO: 3120

YOUNG CONSERVATIVE ORGANIZATION IS LARGEST, BUT RIVAL MORE EFFECTIVE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The Young Conservatives with their 27,000 members are almost twice as large as the Labor Youth League. However certain things suggest that the latter group is more effective. On the central level the Young Conservatives' organizational apparatus is a lot smaller than that of AUF [Labor Youth League]. The youth group of the ruling party has one permanent employee for every thousand members while there are 3000 members to each permanent employee in the Young Conservatives.

When we asked AUF we found that there are around 14,500 members in the organization from all over the country although there are areas where the group admits it is stronger than it is in other areas. This is especially true of the eastern part of the country, Rogaland, Bergen and Trondheim. In all AUF has 382 local groups. Two of these were started up just a few days ago. Groups in Hornviknesset, Hordaland and in Kolstad, Sor-Trondelag just joined the league.

AUF has permanent county secretaries in all the counties in the nation with the exception of Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder and Sogn og Fjordane. The organization has 13 fulltime workers for the central administration in Oslo.

Since it started in 1903 the Labor Youth League has made slow but steady progress. The only "doldrums" encountered by the organization occurred in the period after the EC struggle when the youth group disagreed with the mother party on the issue of membership.

With regard to other political issues, AUF like most political youth groups often disagrees with the mother party.

After the last annual meeting it was decided to send the newspaper, ARBEIDERUNGDOMMEN, to all members as a membership paper. AFTENPOSTEN has learned that this was a popular move among AUF members around the country.

The Conservative youth organization can boast of 27,000 members. But the organization had around 29,000 members in 1973, dropped to 23,000 in 1975-77 and has now stabilized at around 27,000 members. In the last 2 or 3 years the Young Conservatives have signed up around 15,000 new members.

It is in Oslo, Akershus, Vestfold, Rogaland and Hordaland that the Young Conservatives are strongest but things are not doing as well in other areas. For example the organization does not have a county secretary in Ostfold, More og Romsdal, Ser-Trondelag, Troms or Finnmark. But people in the youth organization speculated that work would pick up in the northern part of the country now that the party's former chairman, Erling Norvik, has moved back to Finnmark.

The Young Conservatives have 243 local groups today. That is over 100 more than they had in 1973. There are nine permanent central employees working for the Young Conservatives.

6578

CSO: 3108

ANGRY ARAB REACTION TOWARD PLO POLICY COULD HURT BUSINESS

Mideast Policy Debate Needed

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 Aug 80 p 4

[Editorial: "Norway and the Mideast"]

[Text] Norway's relations with the Arab world have become critical the last few days. The most concrete manifestation hitherto of this intensified stand is that Saudi Arabia has said a temporary no to a visit Commerce Minister Reulf Steen was, according to schedule, to have made in the fall. The reason for the Saudi Arabian postponement is primarily Norway's UN vote last week in connection with the so-called Palestine resolution.

It has been asserted that another possible reason for what has occurred is NRK's [Norwegian Broadcasting System] decision to show the controversial film "Death of a Princess." It is however little likely that this has been of any significance one way or the other. Experiences from other countries which have shown the film have shown that Saudi Arabia has done little or nothing in the way of a counter reaction. The only country which has directly felt Saudi Arabia's anger because of showing of the film is Great Britain. Now, however, diplomatic relations between Jeddah and London have been restored and there has not been any talk of any implacable reaction towards the British either. Saudi Arabia has also already indicated to Norway what it thinks about the NRK decision by having postponed an earlier planned visit by its shipping minister to Norway.

Shipowners together with Administrative Director David Vikøren of Norway's Shipowner's Federation have mustered and demanded that NRK change its decision. From this quarter it is claimed that four billion kroner can be at stake by worsening of economic relations between the two countries. To begin with, we think that this is a considerable overdramatization. To postpone an official visit is a much used remedy in international diplomacy to indicate dissatisfaction with another country's policy. It is not considered to be any specially dramatic example of a reaction and usually does not indicate any permanent deterioration of bilateral relations.

Now, however, Vikøren's reaction is irrelevant because the postponement of the visit has not come as the result of showing of a film, but because there is dissatisfaction with a political decision made by the government. If, however, it had been the "Princess" film which was the reason for what has occurred now, we think that it is absolutely startling that Vikøren is demanding that NRK's decision be changed on account of commercial interests. Such interference in NRK's programming policy would have represented a violation of the central principles associated with freedom of expression here at home.

From the PLO's information office in Stockholm came a few days ago a report that PLO Leader Yasser Arafat is planning a round trip to the Scandinavian countries. A pronouncement by Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund that a condition for Arafat's being allowed to come to Norway is that the PLO clearly indicate Israel's right to exist as part of its policy gave rise to vehement reactions from the information office. Now it appears that the PLO's headquarters in Beirut knows absolutely nothing about any Scandinavian trip for Arafat. It has obviously been a matter more of wishful thinking by the information office in Stockholm than of reality.

On the whole we have the impression that there has been quite heavy over-acting in many circles these days. What happened at the UN last week cannot come as a surprise to anyone who has followed Norwegian Mideast policy the last few years. All attempts on the part of the UN to have resolutions passed which do not clearly indicate Israel's right to exist in the area have been rejected by Norway. The vote this time won a special breakthrough, because there were so few nations which stood together with Norway. It is, however, not our country which has changed its policy, but so many other nations. It is Norway which has been consistent in its Mideast policy, and not, for example, the EC countries, which, of course, have been experiencing the oil shortage as a steadily bigger problem.

Both Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Arvid Johanson and Foreign Affairs Minister Knut Frydenlund have begun to speak about starting an extensive debate regarding Norway's Mideast policy. This will be both useful and necessary. It is especially necessary to appraise the consequences of the steadily more isolated role Norway has been playing in the international community in this matter.

Such a debate, however, will not change anything regarding the basic situation that any political solution in this area must have as a supporting element the fact that Israel be guaranteed rights within safe and respected boundaries.

Ventures Could Suffer

Oslo NORSK HANDELS OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE in Norwegian 9 Aug 80 pp 1, 9

[Article: "Norwegian Part-Owned Concerns in Arabian Gulf--Business of a Billion Today, Market Growing Steadily"]

[Text] The export of Norwegian Goods to Saudi Arabia amounts to only 0.5 percent of our total export of goods, amounting in 1979 to 210 million

kroner. But production by Norwegian part-owned concerns, management agreements, consulting assignments and construction assignments are of a much greater extent.

Investigations made by NORSK HANDELS OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE have shown that five of the major production concerns with Norwegian owner shares in Arab countries which it is feared will react negatively towards Norway in connection with the film "Death of a Princess" and the last UN vote together have a production value of almost 1.7 billion kroner.

In addition come Norwegian shipping interests, consulting services, management agreements, construction assignments and Norwegian concerns' trade in Arab countries with goods imported from other countries than Norway.

This represents business of a billion. Several Norwegian producers sell their products through their own sales offices, and several of them are produced under licenses from Norwegian parent companies. These are also income producing activities.

In addition to this comes the employment which Norwegian contracts represent. Two Norwegian concerns in the Arabian Gulf employ almost 200 Norwegians.

On the basis of this, NORSK HANDELS OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE has reason to believe that it is not unrealistic to count on a profit margin of 10 percent on the minority owner shares such as are in question here. As far as the five concerns in question are concerned, this should amount to 170 million kroner. And the total number of concerns represented in these countries is much larger, although most of them are smaller in terms of business.

In addition to this, the Arab countries are still a market in growth, where new contracts are constantly fought for, and where Japan and Korea especially are now trying to enter both with heavy industry and construction projects.

The industry representatives NORSK HANDELS OG SJØFARTSTIDENDE has been in contact with say that although the earning potentials today represent important money for Norwegian parent concerns, the greater danger can lie in future losses, in the contracts which perhaps will not be entered into.

Norway's direct exports to Saudi Arabia are, on the whole, very low. Saudi Arabia imports only 0.5 percent of our total export of goods, exclusive of oil, platforms and gas. This appears in the official figures of the Central Statistical Bureau. In all of 1979 Norway exported goods worth 210 million, of which 195 million were exports of goods and the rest of ships.

The Central Statistical Bureau's figures for the period of January-May 1980 show a stagnating trend in trade with Saudi Arabia. During this period were exported this year goods worth 65 million, versus 108 million kroner during the same period last year.

Trade Minister: Don't Exaggerate

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 Aug 80 p 9

[Article by Roy Helge Simonsen: "Reiulf Steen on the Fact that He Is Unwanted in Saudi Arabia: 'Do Not Overdramatize'"]

[Text] "I will not dramatize the future consequences of the fact that my visit to Saudi Arabia has been postponed. I am heavily inclined toward further developing relations with Saudi Arabia and from the contacts I have had with, for one thing, the government in that country it is my impression that the interest is mutual."

Commerce and Shipping Minister Reiulf Steen said this to yesterday's report in VG [VERDENS GANG] that Steen is unwanted in Saudi Arabia.

There is, however, much to indicate that it is only Norway's vote in the UN General Assembly on the Palestine question which is the reason for the reaction from the Saudi Arabian authorities. According to what ARBEIDERBLADET has learned, NRK's decision regarding showing the film "Death of a Princess" was not a contributory cause. The reaction to the showing of the film already came through the cancellation of Shipping Minister Bader's trip to Norway earlier this year.

According to what we have learned, signals should have come from Saudi Arabia regarding the fact that the reaction towards Norway in connection with the film would be limited to Bader's postponement of his trip to Norway.

Norway's Shipowner's Federation now fears that shipping interests, to a considerable degree through cargo revenues, amounting to about four billion kroner, now stand in danger. Does Commerce Minister Reiulf Steen share this apprehension?

"It must be clear that the Norwegian business interests which are engaged in Saudi Arabia, shipping, for one thing, rest entirely outside the decisions which can have created irritation in Saudi Arabia."

"I do not rule out the fact that there is a certain basis for apprehension. But my point is that one ought not to overdramatize the situation at the present time."

Are Norwegian authorities going to come in contact with Saudi Arabian authorities in connection with the matter?

"I do wish to have ongoing contact with the Saudi Arabian authorities. And it is vital for me that a relationship of trust be built up with Saudi Arabia. I will do all that I can to make this so."

But there will indeed be no trip to Saudi Arabia this year, in any case?

"No, I do not think so," Commerce and Shipping Minister Reiulf Steen tells ARBEIDERBLADET.

Furthermore, it seems clear that the Norwegian authorities will not exert any pressure on NRK to withhold the showing of the film "Death of a Princess." The justification is that this can lead to a dangerous precedent with regard to the rules of journalistic ethics per se, NRK's sovereign position in the choice of programs and the position of the institution in general.

According to the schedule, Commerce Minister Reiulf Steen was to have led an important shipping delegation to Saudi Arabia in September-October. It was Norway's ambassador in Jeddah who was informed by the Saudi Arabian authorities that it was desired that the visit be postponed for an indefinite period, as it is said in diplomatic language. This happened two or three days ago.

8985

CSO: 3108

OFFICER ASSERTS DECLINE IN INFANTRY-TRAINING LEVEL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Jul 80 p 14

[Article by Knut Falchenberg: "Captain Odd Helge Olsen: Softened Infantry Training"]

[Text] "It is obvious we are thinking of the young men who report for military service these days. They show up with expectations. It is therefore not with a light heart that we are now cutting down on training funds. Far from it," Captain Odd Helge Olsen tells AFTENPOSTEN.

What does one feel as an officer when savings cuts hit the training of soldiers, the very mainstay of the country's defense? We ask a man who is about half way up the ladder of the military hierarchy, who is midway in his career and who is right in the middle of the problems: Captain Odd Helge Olsen on the infantry inspector's staff.

"I have always thought that once we call up soldiers for a year's service in the army we are then obligated to give them training of full value. Every day must be used effectively. Junior officers and noncommissioned officers take this job so seriously that if they are to be satisfied they must also make use of their free time. In military units it is not unusual for junior officers and noncommissioned officers to take work home with them in order to prepare for the next day. Junior noncommissioned officers who live at noncommissioned officer training schools use many an evening for discussing technical questions. It is more than a few hours of work the Defense Ministry gets for nothing in this way," says Olsen.

He has 14 years of service behind him, from Evjemoen near Kristiansand in the south to Porsanger in the north--a great part of the time in direct contact with enlisted men.

The recruits who come together in the infantry these days receive two weeks shorter training than usual. What does this entail?

"Most subjects in the recruit training program are being cut back. For one thing, soldiers will receive less weapons training, fewer lessons in

learning battle techniques both individually and as a squad. They are receiving less physical training and less time for maneuvers and for commanding officer's classes. Driver training in the infantry has also been hit with reductions. The soldiers who after the completion of recruit training are transferred to our regular units will have poorer training than previously."

Realistic Exercises

What does today's soldier like best in the service?

"Realistic exercises in a squad, troop and company," Olsen answers without hesitation. "Obviously it can often prove to be an effort to leave camp and get out in the field. But my experience is that once something has happened the motivation comes to life. Besides, time passes extremely quickly in maneuvers, and soldiers like this."

"Officers have also noticed intensified interest when a changeover is made from using blank ammunition to live. It is first during training with live ammunition that a soldier learns whether he can use his weapon effectively in a field situation. Unfortunately it is extremely limited how much ammunition we can use, especially for heavier weapons."

"In addition to maneuvers, I have also noticed that squad competitions stimulate effort," says Olsen.

But the effort notwithstanding, is it not true that today's infantrymen score low on the tests they have to take? So low that units out of shame are tempted to fudge a little with the statistics?

"I do not know of any fudging. It is true that infantrymen are tested both individually and in groups. This is true, for example, of marksmanship, performance in the field and the handling of weapons. The requirement is that 70 percent of soldiers must pass the tests and this is not the case. With caution, I believe that it is possible to state that test results in the infantry are now somewhat lower than some years ago. With a reduction in training programs in order to save money, we can fear that performance can decline further."

"And in this connection we must not forget that the Defense Ministry stands and falls with its personnel. Even the most advanced weapons are worth nothing if the soldiers behind them cannot use them."

Captain Olsen has no second thoughts about recommending the Defense Ministry as a career. He has himself changed his residence seven times in 14 years and he has noted that guard duty, preparedness and maneuvers can mean unpleasant working hours, often with little monetary compensation.

"But one must also look at the positive aspects of transferring, of meeting new people and of readjusting oneself. This gives variety. And challenges are encountered right from the start. It is, for example, no easy job to lead a company at a garrison and in the field, in all kinds of situations and under various climatic conditions. I think that one has to note that although some junior officers and noncommissioned officers quit the Defense Ministry this happens extremely seldom because the job in itself is not challenging enough," says Captain Olsen.



Odd Helge Olsen

8995

CSO: 8139/1556

SOUSA BRITO DENIES GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE IN MASS MEDIA

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 1 Aug 80 pp 3, 13

[Interview with Dr Sousa Brito, secretary of state for information media; date and place not given]

[Text] The interview that the reader is going to read needs no introduction. Because of the "hot" issues submitted to the secretary of state for information media, Dr Sousa Brito, we may regard it as one of the most necessary interviews to Portuguese mass media, because it has obtained clarifying answers to many crucial questions in the sector.

Here it is, without more preamble.

[Question] Reopening of A REPUBLICA and O SECULO is scheduled. Now, with regard to O SECULO, would a solution be furnished with the forthcoming payment of compensations to the workers? And does the reappearance of O JORNAL DO COMERCIO have any viability?

[Answer] With regard to the reopening of A REPUBLICA, I can tell you nothing. A private newspaper is involved. With regard to O SECULO, I hope to be able to announce basic measures in this matter within approximately a month. Payment of compensations in no way affects the solution or solutions to be contemplated. Moreover, that results from fulfillment by the present government of responsibilities to the workers assumed by previous governments. Government intervention will be lifted from O JORNAL DO COMERCIO shortly and its subsequent destiny will no longer be the responsibility of this Secretariat of State.

[Question] You are opposed and even attacked by some mass media. Do you see in that only a political attack?

[Answer] Opposition, even when it is in the form of an attack, is stimulating and it has taken place within and in accordance with the rules of the democratic game.

[Question] What is troubling the news media in Portugal at present?

[Answer] In one of the aspects of the problem, on the management level, basically from a depletion of capital and from serious management errors, some prior to 25 April [1974] that it has not yet been possible to correct. It is affected by these aspects and also by the lack of efficiency in the labor system, with structures unsuitable for a modern management, in some cases even restricting the creative abilities of the workers. But, of course, the mass media are not this alone, and the troubles from which the mass media are suffering at present in Portugal are, in the final analysis, the consequence of the practice of censorship exercised on journalists during the former regime. At present, newsmen are acting out of a reaction and I include excessive political paternalism and biased analysis of the facts in a plan of affirmation reaction on the part of the newsmen. It is regrettable, however, that this reaction is utilized by political groups and parties. In my opinion, newsmen are letting their recently acquired freedom be restricted and are becoming victims of new kinds of constraint that have now emanated, tacitly or expressly, from the above-mentioned political groups and parties.

[Question] State-owned mass media are accused of manipulation. It is true that the executive branch, or other agencies, are manipulating?

[Answer] For the sake of correctness, not only the state-owned mass media are being accused of manipulation. It is not true that state-owned mass media are manipulated by the executive branch and I do not believe that I am aware that they are manipulated by other government agencies. Just as it is also not true that the private press is necessarily manipulated. The problem of manipulation talked about so much is connected with the aspect that I discussed in my previous reply and I believe that the constant accusation of "who is manipulating whom" only retards the process of authentic freedom and affirmation in which journalists are engaged. We are faced by a vicious circle: the lack of impartiality of certain news items, the exaggeration or concealment of other items, give rise to easy accusations of the existence of manipulation and this accusation creates the appearance of an affirmative reaction on the part of newsmen. This leads automatically to the impossibility for newsmen to treat the "fact-news" with the desired impartiality.

[Question] The state-owned newspapers are on the verge of a collapse (a situation in which we may include the RDP [Portuguese Broadcasting Service]). What solutions does the government have for these cases?

[Answer] Two aspects must be considered here: ideal solutions and possible solutions. And I must confess that pressure is constant for the adoption of ideal solutions, without taking into account the state of affairs that only makes possible solutions feasible. And although I am running the risk of being too lengthy, I cannot fail to say here clearly what I think about the matter. Thus, how do I view the ideal solution? Recapitalization of the enterprises and their reorganization, which must

be accomplished with emphasis on maximum efficiency and organization. This would only be possible, in some cases, with total replacement of equipment in some cases to supplement already existing equipment; with a revision of the work plan, which would entail refresher training and intensive training activities; with adequate utilization of qualified personnel who are in a situation of underutilization and the courage -- which would have to come from the workers themselves -- to proceed possibly to transfer to other public enterprise sectors workers whose presence may not be necessary in accordance with the reorganization plan adopted.

This solution is not possible, however. The country's budget does not allow it. Then, what is left for us to do? With what is allocated to the sector and which also has to take private enterprises into account, an attempt should be made to eliminate the most urgent problems by means of limited action, like economic and financial improvement agreements, partial reorganization, productivity increases where possible, better clarity in industrial accounting procedures, updating of bookkeeping lagging years behind, consolidation of liabilities and other action that can be planned only with the passage of time.

[Question] What responsibilities may the director general of Information have in a possible solution of this state of affairs?

[Answer] None. The director general of Information has nothing to do with the business organization of mass media.

[Question] And when are compensations finally going to be paid to workers discharged by the owners of A REPUBLICA?

[Answer] I suppose that only Dr Gustavo Soromenho and Dr Raul Rego can answer your question.

[Question] What information policy has this government already undertaken?

[Answer] The information policy undertaken by the government in the mass media sector has tried to comply with what is in the government's program on this subject, namely, truth and pluralism, enhancement of work and ability, respect of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, equal access by the public and private mass media organs to official sources of information and progressive equality in the pertinent economic and financial statutes and also maintenance of ideological equilibrium and independence with regard to the government by the state-owned mass media organs. I do not believe that it is possible to doubt that in spite of all the concerted activity of certain groups and parties against this sector it can be said that the government has not undertaken the policy that it promised to follow.

Moreover, within its information policy, the government committed itself to inform the public regularly on the policy to be followed in this sector as well as in the other sectors of its activity. No one can fail to admit

that the government has been prevented systematically, under various accusations, principally the accusation of engaging in election propaganda, from carrying out this point in its program.

[Question] And what program for the sector does it promise the Portuguese people, if it wins the forthcoming election?

[Answer] It is not up to me to be the government's spokesman in this matter.

[Question] Will that program be published only during the election campaign or will it be disclosed before it?

[Answer] It is up to the AD [Democratic Alliance] political parties to make a pronouncement on this subject.

[Question] Or does it have no program for information, as it is being accused by the opposition?

[Answer] Do you honestly believe that it has no program?

[Question] What future is there for the state-owned newspapers?

[Answer] What the people decide freely and democratically.

[Question] Are subsidies and other forms of aid to those information organs going to continue?

[Answer] The whole government policy is based, because of its refusal to assume paternalistic powers, on a progressive reduction of these subsidies kept aside from aid to private newspapers. For example, 85.8 percent of the paper subsidy is absorbed by the private press. The nationalized banks financed the private press for almost a million contos and I hope shortly to be able to announce the plans drawn up by the government for consolidation of these amounts and additional support to private enterprises.

[Question] As is known, the subsidies (including nonreimbursable subsidies) granted last year to state-owned mass media organs were rather high. How are they going to be this year or how have they been?

[Answer] This year, the nonreimbursable subsidies to the press will be lower in real value than last year, because they are maintained at the amount of nominal values. On the other hand, if all the nonreimbursable subsidies to the whole mass media sector -- including support to the private press -- are taken into account, the subsidies to the press will decrease this year by 20 percent in comparison with last year. This is significant as a concrete aspect of the policy undertaken in the sector.

[Question] Where are the funds going to come from for compensating the O SECULO workers and what will be their amount?

[Answer] From where funds of those who cannot pay on their own come from: from the General Budget of the State. This amounts to saying that it is up to the Portuguese people, who did not help to destroy O SECULO, to pay this bill also.

[Question] As is known, with the April [1974] event, the mass media, in Portugal, underwent complete liberalization, at least theoretically. Abolition of censorship was an important step toward that. What good came out of it for the country? What difficulties did it cause? How did Portuguese newsmen behave with regard to that fact?

[Answer] Abolition of censorship is, always and under all circumstances, a highly positive factor, an absolutely essential requirement of freedom and democracy. Thus, I believe that I have said in short what good it brought to the country. You ask me what difficulties it caused. None. It is not the opening of the dam that causes trouble. It is the excess water that it contains, which causes flood damage when it overflows.

I believe that the best way to answer when you ask me how the Portuguese newsmen behaved when they were confronted by that event is to try to debunk the problem. Newsmen are not abstract entities. They are men with the dimension of good qualities and defects that we all have. Nor would I say that the newsmen "behaved" in one way or another. I would say, rather, how they reacted. I believe that I can say with being wrong that, with regard to that new fact, longed for, hoped for and even feared by some because it gave rise to total responsibility, each one reacted in accordance with the dimension of his own defects and good qualities. Only that the fact of the abolition of censorship was so important that, as I have already said previously, it caused, in certain cases, excessive but understandable affirmation reactions. The practice of reporting without fear of censorship or without taking cover in it is also learned.

As always happens in these cases -- the wind shifts, the way of thinking shifts -- some journalists dissatisfied with the new "times" found a way to join up with certain prominent political figures, obtaining (news) domination of some sectors of the nation's activity, commonly called advisers. How does the executive branch regard these "chameleons"? This, too, is once more a problem of persons and not of professional duty. Only the profession can dictate the ethical rules for the profession, just as only the profession can cause them to be obeyed. And this will finally happen.

FALLDIN SAYS GOVERNMENT STILL WANTS GAS FROM NORWAY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] Lulea, Friday--"It is clear that the Swedish Government is both willing and able to invest the money needed to start up the industrial projects in the Scandinavian Shield that may result from possible gas and oil deposits off the coast of northern Norway." That announcement was made by Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin (Center Party) in Lulea on Friday.

Falldin was opening a Nordic so-called Scandinavian Shield Conference for general political debate--the 12th of its kind--under the auspices of the Nordic Society. It was his first public appearance following a month-long vacation.

Falldin was cautious in his opening speech. In general, he merely noted that the deposits, if they produce results, can give the region a big industrial boost during the 1990's. He did not discuss in greater detail the form that cooperation might take. That can best be determined by a task force that is expected to turn in its report in a year's time.

Money Is Available

But after his speech, he explained to DAGENS NYHETER that Sweden is prepared to invest whatever is necessary to get cooperation going--if the opportunities exist.

Falldin said, "We can always find money for investments. Money like that is easy to borrow. It is another story when it is a question of money for consumption."

Here in the Scandinavian Shield the government has been criticized a great deal for not taking steps to begin preparations for the coming cooperation.

Ingvar Svanberg, Social Democratic member of Parliament from Norrbotten, says, "It is not just a matter of coming up with money; it is also a question of guiding and taking part in development here."

Falldin brushes aside the criticism, however, by saying that it was not until just recently that the Norwegian Government even decided to make test drillings in northern Norway. He said that before that, Sweden could not reasonably just walk in and do something.

Long-Term Planning

Sivert Nordvall, Social Democratic city councilman in Kiruna, points out that an investment such as this requires a lot of long-term planning, not least from the Swedish side.

He told DAGENS NYHETER, "What will be involved, of course, if it comes to building a gas pipeline from northern Norway through Sweden, is a gigantic investment. One doesn't spit out that kind of money from just nowhere."

The very vague plans include a gas pipeline from northern Norway through Kiruna and perhaps down to Lulea, with a possible extension into Finland.

The Scandinavian Shield's politicians are also dreaming--and to the many sorely tried northerners, the whole thing is a dream--about the use of gas in Swedish ore processing. It might also make further processing of iron possible thanks to the cheaper gas.

Plastics Industry

There is also talk of the creation of a petrochemical (plastics) industry, preferably in small units that could be distributed over the Scandinavian Shield area. Finland could also enter the picture in this scenario.

In Finland, officials are terrified that the discovery of oil and gas deposits in northern Norway will create a great new wave of emigration from northern Finland, where there is widespread unemployment. In Rovaniemi, Governor Asko Oivas emphasizes the need for Finland also to get industries and not simply provide the manpower. He even says that no Finnish worker will have to leave to find work on the Scandinavian Shield project.

Ingvar Svanberg, a veteran of the first Scandinavian Shield Conference back in 1960, says somewhat lyrically that the gas and oil deposits "have breathed new life into the entire Scandinavian Shield discussion."

New Will

He observes that before this, cultural matters were about the only thing they could discuss. That did not produce much. Now, perhaps, they have an economic foundation on which to build.

And the political will is now much stronger than before, noted Under Secretary Trygve Tamburstuen of Norway's Ministry of Industry.

But he repeatedly urged the approximately 200 participants to be realistic and those insisting on early planning to stop and think. The fact is, of course, that so far there is nothing to make plans about. He said, "We do not know whether there is gas or oil in northern Norway. Let us not plan before we do know. And if they exist, we cannot begin to extract them before 1990. We have lots of time."

FALLDIN WARNS OF ECONOMIC CRISIS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Kaa Eneberg]

[Text] Pitea, Saturday--A prime minister should not get ahead of himself by saying that an increase in the value-added tax is imminent. It makes people panic. Not until a government decision on the matter exists can he say such a thing.

But in a conversation with DAGENS NYHETER in Pitea on Saturday, Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin noted, "But Sweden is undeniably on the verge of an economic crisis, and something must be done about it."

The leader of the Center Party feels completely entangled in the many conflicting reports on what the government should do to overcome the growing budget deficit--our growing foreign debt. Thorbjorn Falldin was talking about those speculations on Saturday while he sweated through a gigantic trade fair in Pitea--the so-called Nolia Fair.

Quickly Worsening Situation

Between handshakes with visitors to the fair, Thorbjorn Falldin observed that Sweden's economic situation is considerably worse today than it was a month ago. It was then, before his vacation, that he declared that an increase in the value-added tax was not imminent.

But he quickly added, while walking in shirtsleeves across the broiling hot fairgrounds:

"But this does not mean that an increase in the value-added tax is imminent now, either."

He did not deny, however, that there has been lengthy discussion within the government concerning the possibility of raising the value-added tax.

He said, "We don't discuss it at our cabinet meetings. I am simply having informal contacts."

Growing Gap

One of the prime minister's so-called informal contacts is Minister of Agriculture Anders Dahlgren, among other fellow party members. Dahlgren said recently in Visby (and his tone indicated approval) that an increase in the value-added tax may be unavoidable. That would be one way of stemming our growing imports, which are not in proportion to our own production.

But Thorbjorn Falldin said that the government has to decide just now is not whether the value-added tax should be increased or not.

The most important thing is to find the cause of the growing gap between the large outflow of foreign exchange in June and a production level that did not keep pace. It must be determined whether the cause is something permanent or not.

Effect of Strike

"When we look at production, we must keep in mind that we had a strike with severe aftereffects. Generally speaking, all production stopped for an entire month, and activity in the ports was paralyzed even longer than that. It is the effects of that that we have to contend with now."

Falldin agreed with opposition leader Olof Palme that the situation is the nearest thing to a crisis. He noted that the trade balance for the latest 6-month period showed a result that is about 2 or 3 billion kronor worse than expected. No one expected it, he said.

But that is where Thorbjorn Falldin and Olof Palme part company in their views of the economy, at least as far as the prime minister is concerned.

Bitterness

As he stood in Pitea, Falldin showed obvious bitterness at the opposition leader's sharply negative attitude toward an increased value-added tax. He has expressed it on several occasions, one of them being his speech in Almedal.

"It would be strange, of course, if he were to agree with our economic reasoning. But there is nothing we can do to make him happy.

"For that matter, his reasoning concerning an increased value-added tax reveals his total ignorance of economic matters," said Thorbjorn Falldin, and he mentioned the opposition leader's statement that an increase in the value-added tax unfairly hits the weak in society.

He pointed out that pensioners, for example, are automatically protected. As to the question of how the reduced purchasing power of families with children can be offset in case of an increased value-added tax, Thorbjorn Falldin said that this had not been discussed at all.

RETURNING RIKSDAG TO CONFRONT RAPIDLY WORSENING ECONOMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 14 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Lars Hellberg]

[Text] Stockholm--Sweden is in the midst of an economic crisis. Theoretically it may be possible to finance a living standard at the present high level for a little longer by borrowing money abroad. But the negative trend is in the air. Unless people literally resort to the doubtful practice of heating the house by burning furniture bought on the installment plan.

All the economists we talked to agreed on this diagnosis although they have differing opinions as to the concrete moves needed right away and in the long run. The upcoming hike in the value-added tax could check private consumption but at best this is a remedy that will stop the fever without curing the underlying disease. And the ridiculously long warning period provided could set off a wave of hoarding with regard to capital goods.

These factors are behind this desperate state of affairs:

The trade balance this year is expected to produce a deficit of 10 billion Swedish kronor.

The total foreign balance is heading toward a deficit of at least 19 billion.

The national budget for 1980-81 was based on a deficit of 55 billion kronor but this will probably be closer to 60 billion when the accounts are added up.

The economists agree that the country cannot export its way out of the foreign deficit which is twice as high as it was last year. If we use the accepted international rule of thumb that every export billion means 10,000 industrial jobs an "export solution" would require an enormous expansion of industrial jobs, perhaps close to 400,000 new jobs.

The structure of the Swedish economy today means that each export krona is based on imports worth 50 ore. In addition, developments over the past 10 years have gone in the opposite direction. There are 40,000 fewer people employed in Swedish industry today than there were in 1970. And 200,000 Swedes work in industries operating at a loss or in loss-producing sectors of otherwise profitable firms.

As director Bengt Ryden of the Research Association for Industry and Society put it, "The problem is not that Swedes don't work enough, it is that they work in the wrong sectors. Too much emphasis has been placed for too long on weak branches, to put it bluntly. As a result people will have to undergo much harder cutbacks in the future than would have been necessary if the layoffs, closings and restructuring had occurred earlier."

SVENSKA DAGBLADET made the following summation to illustrate the size of the problem: Sweden needs to export another 250,000 Volvos costing 50,000 Swedish kronor apiece, 10 million more Electrolux refrigerators at 1000 kronor each and 6 million tons of pulp at 2300 kronor a ton in order to make up for this year's deficit.

This would provide total export revenues of 38 billion more from which one must subtract the 19 billion it costs for the import share of the export increase which will never be anything but a dream or--as it is here--an example in figures of the way things are.

The continuous crisis in industrial branches based on domestic raw materials, which once buoyed up Swedish prosperity, in combination with an unbearably high wage and cost level has turned the Swedish economy into a composition factory. In 1970 forestry, iron ore and the steel industry represented 35 percent of exports compared to only 28 percent last year. And on top of that many of the firms behind this 28 percent are in a crisis or are threatened by one. The shipbuilding industry is a chapter in itself. It is a fact that ships are being built and sold for prices that don't even cover the scrap value let alone the cost of raw materials.

In this situation the most foresighted people are trying to find new work areas, new products and entirely new markets or are working to replace the imported components in the engineering industries with components produced in Sweden to reduce imports in this way.

But again the cost level is a formidable barrier. The tendency here is also clearly negative: More and more firms assign production to lands with lower cost levels. Just since 1974 the number of foreign workers in Swedish-owned firms rose from 285,000 to 346,000. Thus expansion is taking place abroad with the opportunities this gives for lower costs but this does not solve Sweden's balance problems with the rest of the world.

No, the economists agree that the balance problems cannot be solved by increasing exports. Even now there are only five countries in the entire world with a larger export economy than that of Sweden. Dependence on international developments is already a formidable problem and competition on the export market will increase.

The collective inability and lack of desire to keep wage contracts within limits the Swedish economy can live with can lead to the situation described by communist leader Lars Werner after hearing of the hike in the value-added tax: "For the third time they are correcting the results of the wage negotiations. The workers went out on strike last spring for this and now the government is taking it back and reducing real wages."

Actually he is right although responsible government members and independent economists would describe the course of events somewhat differently. The crisis of confidence in the union movement has created the uneasy situation for the nonsocialist government where it is necessary to step in afterwards in the hope of restoring some balance at least, without strengthening the position of the business community with the value-added tax increase that the government resorted to this time. The risk of higher unemployment is obvious.

But it would be worse if they let things go a while longer. It is the eternal problem of "cutting one's coat to fit one's cloth," as the Swedes put it. But private consumption is not the big problem. The problem is and will continue to be the high collective consumption which leads the state to take 65 percent of the Gross National Product to keep on financing all the reforms, state and municipal service institutions, which were once paid for through continual economic growth but which to an increasing extent today must be financed by what former Finance Minister Gunnar Strang called the foreign bankers.

The Falldin government has settled down in an effort to get at the heart of the problem. The trend must be stamped out. State spending must be trimmed to match funding. But it remains to be seen whether a nonsocialist government that is out of step with the union movement and has a slim one vote majority in Riksdag can make real changes.

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ECEVIT ADDRESSES PARTY JOINT GROUP

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 30 Jul 80 pp 1, 9

/Text/ Ankara (CUMHURİYET BUREAU) -- Addressing yesterday's meeting of the RPP joint groups, General Chairman Bulent Ecevit presented information on the Cankaya talks and said, "Some bills relating to security were reviewed once again and I told the Cankaya meeting that we could better contribute to their discussion in the houses of parliament."

Caglayangil and JP-RPP

Reporting his views on the meeting which was chaired by Caglayangil, Ecevit pointed out that Caglayangil was opposed to a government that would bring the RPP and the JP /Justice Party/ together. "Since he is not an elected president and retains his JP membership, Mr Caglayangil can hardly be expected to take a position different from the JP general chairman's on basic matters," he said.

Ecevit recalled that the RPP-JP coalition in 1961 had been useful and said, "Later with Mr Demirel as general chairman, the JP took a definite stand against the constitution on which the state is founded and, forming a rightist front which could be supported by militants, began to follow a strategy to make basic changes in the constitution and the state. This strategy makes it hard for the RPP, which upholds the constitution, to cooperate, even in times of utmost crisis for the nation, with the JP, which rejects the constitution."

Ecevit said that the Cankaya meeting reiterated once more that Turkey's primary problems were the problems of the presidency and the government. "It is obvious that no other problems can be resolved until these are resolved and out of the way. The presidency and government problems have gotten tangled up with each other. In this case, what we have to do is redouble our democratic efforts to rescue Turkey from this JP minority government as soon as possible," he said.

Ecevit said he would discuss efforts on the parliamentary questions another day and that he would participate himself in preparation of group procedural rules on parliamentary questions and added that the general

executive board was engaged in discussion of the Jerusalem problem. Ecevit said, "Israel's attempt to make Jerusalem its capital will open a suppurating sore in the Middle East that will infect the entire world."

Izmir National Deputy Suleyman Genc took the floor after Ecevit's statement and asked why discussion of restraint and terrorism laws should be taken up when laws with social content were waiting on the Assembly agenda. Genc recalled the proposal to discuss party strategy in the group before discussing these laws and commented on the need for this proposal to be on the agenda.

RPP General Chairman Ecevit then took the floor a second time to say that the proposal on prior discussion of general strategy had nothing to do with the matters at hand, that there was nothing in these matters to require a change of strategy and that the six days of discussions held in past weeks actually covered party policy in every way.

Ecevit explained that when they requested discussion of the social laws, the prime minister was trying to remove the 60 salary questions from the agenda. He then criticized Suleyman Genc severely for his reference to restraint and terrorism. "None of these laws has anything to do with restraint or terrorism. Just the opposite, they are sanctions that we want to bring to bear against restraint and terrorism. We also have new proposals relative to the laws. But for a member of our own group to brand the bills as restraint and terrorism laws before even hearing them does nothing but damage the party," he said.

Ecevit continued as follows:

"What is a restraint law? What is a terrorism law? Is giving monetary compensation to the martial law and security officers who are forced to work 24 hours a day a terrorism law? Is it a restraint law to put arms smuggling under the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Courts? We will come to you before long with different proposals increasing the sentence for taking extortion; is this a restraint law? Some newspapers are being obstructed by fascists. They are having to use force to sell their own newspapers. We are proposing sanctions against this. Is this a restraint law? None of these has anything to do with restraint and terrorism."

Gunay's Statement

[Ertugrul] Gunay spoke after Ecevit, pointing out the need to be very careful in passing the law giving powers to the government. "So we give these powers, but to whom are we giving them? It is necessary to consider well," he said.

Recalling the principles which the RPP had defended in 1975, Gunay said, "At that time we were defending the need to politicize all sectors of society. Now we are opposing the involvement of the associations in politics. The evil of those principles has not been understood from that day to this. We are suffering the consequences of the 1975 line."

Isik's Statement

Bursa National Deputy Hasan Esat Isik also spoke in the group, saying that the government seemed inclined to divert the National Security Council from its duties. He continued as follows:

"The government has moved out of parliament, virtually hiding behind the National Security Council. This behavior is promulgating the impression that the parliamentary agenda is being set from outside. We cannot remain indifferent to this.

"The government's evaluation of its approach to events, in a word, its mentality, should change as well as the laws, indeed before. There is an attempt to make parliament mere window dressing. All of us have an unavoidable duty to oppose this. The best thing to do under the present circumstances is to stress dialog and cooperation between the two large parties and work toward the formation of a government with a special program."

Commission Formed

It was decided next in the RPP joint group to form a commission to determine the party view on the five bills and pick out the antidemocratic provisions in them. It was also decided that the group executive board should appoint the members of this commission.

The group executive board met after the group meeting and appointed Internal Party Commission members and two RPP members to the Interparty Commission and discussed the questions to be introduced concerning certain ministers who are members of the government.

Commanders' Warning Letter

Ertoz Vahit Suicmez had asked during the group meeting whether there had been a letter of warning from the commanders, and Ecevit replied in summary as follows, giving his impressions of Caglayangil's dinner:

"At the beginning of the conversation, Demirel jokingly asked Caglayangil, 'Are you going to give us a letter?' Caglayangil let the question pass without answering. In later stages of the discussion, however, Mr Caglayangil said that the chief of staff and force commanders had expressed certain views in the National Security Council. I got the impression that these were given to Caglayangil in the form of a written text. While Caglayangil and Demirel expressed their views and desires during the discussions on the State Security Courts and the extraordinary circumstances lay, when they said something to the effect that these were the proposals of the commanders, I said that this was not correct, that I knew the commanders were not insisting that these laws be passed. Caglayangil then admitted that this was true also."

Decision to Form Interparty Commission

The National Assembly Advisory Council decided in its meeting yesterday that an interparty commission on the laws to be passed by the houses of parliament should be formed, that the commission should begin deliberations this morning and complete its discussions by Monday and that a special agenda should be set for Tuesday to discuss the laws.

Participating in yesterday's Advisory Council meeting were Metin Tuzun from the RPP, Giyasettin Karaca from the JP, Sener Battal from the National Salvation Party, Faruk Demirtola from the Nationalist Action Party and Minister of State Koksai Toptan. It was decided in the meeting that a joint commission should be formed among the parties in order to form a synthesis whereby all parties could reach a unity of view on the social laws now on the Assembly agenda as well as the five laws taken up in Ecevit-Demirel discussions. The parties having a parliamentary group will send two members each to this commission and the joint commission will hold its first meeting tomorrow morning at 1000.

According to the Advisory Council decision, the interparty commission is to complete its work by Monday on the laws to be taken up with priority on a special agenda in the Assembly and debate of the bills will begin in the National Assembly on Tuesday after the Advisory Council prepares the special agenda Tuesday morning.

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'CUMHURİYET' SEES FASCISTS OVERRUNNING ISPARTA

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Jul 80 p 5

/Article by Hikmet Cetinkaya: "Fascists Out of Control in 'Demirel Principality' of Isparta"/

/Text/ Are you familiar with Yenice Village in Gelendost District, Isparta? We think Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel would give a most positive answer to this question, because Isparta is his own electoral district.

We are now in the Kemer area of Yenice Village. The people of Kemer are speaking out as follows and asking that helping hands be extended to them:

"The situation, in our opinion, is just as important as the killings, the slaughter, the chases and the liberated regions."

Kemer People

The people who live in Kemer today came and settled here as nomads centuries ago. They have their own cemeteries. They belong to the Karacakal Tribe. Their lives are totally tied to Kemer economically. For centuries they have lived in shelters called "kelif." A "kelif" is a stone hut about 1 meter high with a roof of thatched rushes.

Kemer is 13 kilometers from Yenice Village. It sits beside the lake and along the shores of the straits connecting Egridir Lake and Hoyron Lake. It has a natural beauty reminiscent of the Bosphorus. The hills and fields of the Kemer people rise behind their homes.

The people of Kemer and Yenice have not been on friendly terms for years for political reasons. The "nomad-villager" conflict made worse by the politicians, especially Saadettin Bilgic, has kept the people of the two villages, living in the same locale, at odds with each other for the past 30 years since 1950.

For this reason, the Yenice villagers have not even allowed Kemerians to have a house to live in. Houses built at night have been torn down by day by mobs of 150 to 200 people, because the poor people of Kemer are progressive. And their opponents are fascists who support the JP /Justice Party/

Why are these things done? What lies behind this cruelty and oppression? The goal is to take political revenge on the people of Kemer, to drive them from the land which they settled and to leave them homeless with no place to go. Then the aghas of Yenice could seize their lands and add wealth to their wealth.

The people of Kemer have been fighting for their freedom since the 1950's. More than 20 Kemerians were hurt in incidents which occurred in 1950. In 1977, 150 to 200 fascist thugs burned the Kemerians' crops. They even tore up the barbed wire fences around their gardens and hauled them away with tractors.

So we arrive at 1977...

On the first day of the Kurban Holidays, JP and NAP /Nationalist Action Party/ thugs from Yenice made a raid on Kemer. They destroyed the homes of seven families. An armed clash erupted. Women were beaten and assaulted.

The fascists had now let matters get completely out of control. They were planning raids on Kemer every night. They set fire to the sheepfolds and stole the animals. Armed clashes were occurring every day while security forces just looked on. One night the fascists wounded a man named Halil Ozdemir. The car in which a teacher was taking the injured man to the hospital was stopped by fascists. The fascists who shot at the car fled. But this time the guilty ones were arrested. All of them got 7 years in jail.

Their Lives

This is the kind of hardship the people of Kemer are living under. The Kemerians, who make a living from raising animals, hunting and fishing, want the raids and terrorism to stop tomorrow. In short, they want the oppression lifted and to live like human beings.

The only crime which the people of Kemer have committed is to vote for the RPP. But the RPP Isparta organization does not acknowledge them. Even during the 22 months of the RPP administration, the Yenice fascist thugs conducted raids, burned their homes and set fire to their crops.

It is said that Saadettin Bilgic's NAP members are especially active in Kemer with its 40 homes. For years, he has wanted to get revenge on the people of Kemer. But the Kemerians say they will not give in to all this cruelty and oppression.

It is easy to say that the people of Kemer have been at war for 30 years. Without fear, without giving up. Some may think this is all a joke, but it is true. Believe me.

Let Us Come to Isparta

Now let us come to Isparta. Isparta, the electoral district of Prime Minister Demirel -- have you been there in recent months?

For example, you get on the bus at Istanbul, Ankara or Izmir and get off at the Isparta terminal at 1000. Two or three people immediately materialize at your side. They are carrying spades or forks.

A hail of questions begins:

"Where did you come from?"

"What did you come to do?"

"Let's see your I.D."

Who are they? Acting Interior Minister Eren, we ask you, who are these people?

These 18- to 19-year-olds are Isparta fascists. They are fascists that Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's brothers, Sevkettin and Hacı Ali Demirel, brought in. These fascists, shielded by the Demirel brothers' businesses, are under the protection of the governor and security director.

We called and said we wanted to go to Isparta:

"What time does the bus leave?"

"It doesn't matter what time the bus leaves, but be at the terminal early in the morning."

Nobody can argue with this. This is a fact. Nobody can deny it.

Fascist terrorism is mounting every day in Isparta. Progressive, democratic, patriotic people are being intimidated.

Fascists have thoroughly taken over the Isparta Training Institute and the Gonen Teachers' Academy.

Isparta Residents Explain

Isparta has changed its name. The new name is "Demirel Principality." In fact, this is a apt name, because the Demirel family dominates this lovely province of ours. The moment you say something, if you are an official, you are hurried off to some remote corner.

Let us listen to the progressive, democratic and patriotic Ispartans, without revealing their identities:

"Fascist terrorism grew tremendously during the National Front administration. Taking advantage of the fact that the interior minister was from Isparta, the fascists let things get completely out of hand. Most of the people were brought in from the outside. The Demirels gave them jobs in their factories. It became impossible to read CUMHURİYET, DEMOKRAT, GÜNAYDIN AND MİLLİYET."

Another Ispartan says:

"Our lives are not safe. They block the streets. They attack progressives and make identification inspections. They want to stifle us, to keep us quiet. But we will not give in. We will fight fascism with all our strength."

Yes, this is the way it is in Kemer and in Isparta, the electoral district of Süleyman Demirel, the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey.

What do you say, Demirel?

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'CUMHURİYET' EXAMINES THE MENTALITY OF KEMAL TURKLER

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 29 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Sukran Ketenci: "Understanding Kemal Turkler"]

[Text] Whether you liked him or not, Nihat Erim was a person with an important place in Turkish political life. But we all watched on TV as tumults followed his casket as he was buried with an official state ceremony open to public attendance.

And, on Friday, a prominent labor leader, Kemal Turkler, was buried with upwards of 100,000 Turks attending the funeral, 200,000 if you count the ones who could not get to the funeral for the crowd.

Our people traditionally remember the good things about a person after he dies. But despite having a special respect and many good memories of Kemal Turkler, I would like, though so soon after his death, to go into one of his most negative aspects, a question left in many minds, because I believe that if we know what is seen as the worst side of Kemal Turkler, we will be able to understand the phenomenon of Turkler, who put his stamp on the Turkish labor movement.

We return to the days of the campaign launched against Kemal Turkler personally in order to get at DISK /Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions/, the growing revolutionary union organization, to the days when Turkler was indicted because of his material wealth. In addition to the public announcements he made concerning the patently unjust accusations directed against him, Kemal Turkler had also made a special statement to me which took up practically half the day and went into a full economic accounting of his life down to the liras. I remember as if it were yesterday, when I complied with his request and conveyed this statement to known intellectual circles, a friend of mine said, "We fully admit that he has not taken labor money, but you can't tell me that a labor leader who passes for a socialist ought to be all that rich." Certainly a unionist's desire for wealth was beyond the comprehension of the socialist intellectuals who exhausted their salaries in the first few days of the month and then lived on loans from friends and relatives, but who had never

experienced real hunger because they had their diplomas and places where they could borrow money. To tell the truth, when his house in Mörter, where he was shot coming out the door, was being built, I could not understand, either, his delight in touring the construction site every weekend for a year or two with his wife and children. But in those days I was trying to understand what the workers thought and I discussed the same subject with every worker I met. Not one worker blamed him for being wealthy or driving around in a Mercedes as long as he did not take union money. Jobless, hungry workers experienced vicariously the feeling of security that would come with owning a home and property. And for this reason, not one accused their leader.

Intellectuals and politicians in Turkey usually have no love for "professional" unionists, looking down on them with reproach. In fact, there are many ugly stories that could be told from the world of the professionals who came from the factories and rose through the ranks in the merciless war of trade unionism. But this indiscriminate accusation of professionals, thinking to take the spring out of the Turkish unionism movement by getting rid of the professionals, and the policy pursued in this respect have yet to make any inroad on labor. Despite all the efforts of the intellectuals and politicians, the years of struggle, practically no intellectual leader has yet emerged from the workers' ballot boxes. Occasionally people who have not yet learned the real ropes of unionism, who are still basically laborers, have risen quickly to top leadership echelons with a great deal of support from intellectuals or politicians. But looking at the inside story of labor, all of these leaders have failed, being unable to give proper ear to the voice of the worker, selecting a student type as labor representative on behalf of the worker with five children and precipitating a strike, or not understanding how collective agreement negotiations should be conducted. For the most part, they have harmed the union and workers, and when the union which thought that it was being revolutionary begins losing much of its strength, experience has been that the old professional leaders who were accused of selling out the working class have been called on to help get the collective agreements going.

In short, if the intellectuals and politicians are going to learn from their experience, they have to understand that the working class does not want and will not elect someone who is not of itself, who cannot hear its voice.

Anticipating the reactions of any readers who may disagree with me, I would immediately emphasize that it is not my intention to defend professional unionists who have diverted the Turkish working class movement from its line or even to put them on the same side of the scales with an important labor leader like Kemal Türkler.

As opposed to the Turkish labor movement and the extraordinary awareness and development at the worker level, what we do not like, in fact, is for the most part in the purview of the professionals who harm the labor

movement. Hundreds of thousands of workers in the Turkish Confederation of Labor, under which the majority of workers is organized, are still in tow by a lot of leaders whose single distinction is their thorough knowledge of unionism.

When the worker gets to the ballot box, he does not vote for the intellectual. Even if he occasionally elects those who do not make good unionists proposed by the intellectuals and politicians, he is hurt by it and avoids voting for them again. Let them shout and carry on, but this reflects a dominant common sense, an instinctual natural intelligence in the real sense in the worker, not ignorance.

The worker makes it clear by this attitude that direction by those not from among his own is not wanted. He prefers the bad from among his own to the good who are not.

In view of the unchanging nature of this fact over the years and its essential rightness and justness, what should the people do who expect so much from the Turkish working class movement? Unless this fact is taken seriously, if it is thought that the working class movement can be run from the outside, the working class movement will remain in the hands of the professionals, most of whom are bad for it.

Kemal Turkler came from the working class, he was a professional, but he was also a labor leader self-educated in the science of the working class. And for this reason he accomplished important things which put his stamp on history in the Turkish working class movement. The founding and growth of DISK, the founding of the Turkish Labor Party, 15-16 June, class unionism -- his stamp is on all of them. And even with his death, a turning point has begun in the resistance to fascism.

The Turkish working class movement will flourish in the hands of union leaders who come from the working class, who are self-made men, who do not betray the class. The duty of the intellectuals and politicians is not to run the working class from the outside but to make the sort of contribution to enable it to learn how to run itself.

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ISTANBUL MODEL PLAN FINALLY APPROVED

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 30 Jul 80 p 3

/Text/ Istanbul -- The "Istanbul Metropolitan Area Plan" is complete after 13 years in the works. Reconstruction and Resettlement Minister Turgut Toker put the final seal on the 1/50000-scale map yesterday.

Ceremonies were held at the Odakule Area Planning Directorate to celebrate approval of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Plan, which had been submitted unsuccessfully for approval five times before. Reconstruction and Resettlement Minister Turgut Toker spoke at the ceremony, pointing out that it was necessary that the "Metropolis Administration Law" be passed first in order that this plan could be implemented and that work in this regard was almost complete. He said, in summary:

"The Istanbul 1/50000-scale plan has been completed at the metropolitan level. Istanbul is a commercial center. It is an industrial center and a port city. It is the crucial point in land-sea transport. It has exceptional natural beauty. Istanbul is the scene of rapid urbanization. It is developing and changing rapidly. Planning is difficult for all these reasons and because all factors are in flux.

"With the present plan, the metropolitan area is defined on the west by the Istanbul Province boundary and on the east by the Istanbul Province boundary and the Gebze city limits.

"If urbanization is permitted without planning, the population of Istanbul will be 19.6 million in 1995.

"We hope that the people will help us in implementing the plan."

The purpose of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area Plan was stated as "increasing the benefit to the nation of the international significance of metropolitan Istanbul without destroying its unique values appreciated throughout the nation and the world and creating in this context the functions and services necessary to the growth and development of the metropolis in harmony with national development." The goals according to which the plan was prepared were listed as follows: "Integration of development of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area and the Marmara Region with national development," "Preservation of natural, historical and cultural values,"

"Protection of Istanbul's sources of potable water," "Making optimum use of limited energy resources on a national scale," "Giving priority to correction of the existing problems in the tissue of the city," "Sound and organized realization of new urban development areas," "Programming housing production according to the peculiarities of need and demand," "Balancing areas of employment in the metropolitan area in compliance with national employment policy," "Planning industrial areas bearing in mind industry's functional pollution," "Developing the business district as the major center of the city," "Providing recreational and open urban areas to conform to the population of the metropolitan area," "Increasing tourism's share in the intersectoral balance of land use," "Providing a better balance between mass transit and individual transportation throughout the metropolitan area in such a way as to be least inconvenient to the public and least damaging to the environment," and "Reducing the cost to society of intercity transportation."

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GERMAN VISA DECISION SEEN AS ILLEGAL

Ankara TURKIYE IKTISAT GAZETESI in Turkish 24 Jul 80 pp 1, 8

/Text/ The Union of Turkish Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Stock Exchanges /TTSOTB/ has published a circular in response to the requirement by German officials of a visa for Turks going to West Germany.

The verbatim text of the circular, which bears the signature of TTSOTB President Mehmet Yazar, is as follows:

"By a unilateral decision, the German Government in June 1980 made it obligatory for Turkish Citizens going to Germany to obtain visas from German officials. This is an attempt to prevent Turkish workers from going to Germany to work.

"This unjust and unnecessary decision is bound to create reactions in the Turkish labor world. It is a great disappointment for the friendly state of Germany to make such a decision at a time when Turkey, as a nation which took its place years ago in the Western world and has borne without hesitation its duties in this regard, is redoubling its efforts to overcome the economic difficulties it is experiencing and international organizations are supporting these efforts. It is a known fact that foreign exchange remittances sent home by our workers abroad are an important element in covering our balance of payments deficit and that our need for foreign aid is reduced to the extent that these transfers are multiplied. While this is the case, it is a source of concern for a friendly nation to hinder Turkey's efforts toward what may be described as self-help.

"The German Government's decision violates the basic principles of the European Economic Community as well as the agreements signed between the EC and Turkey. In fact, article 12 of the Ankara Agreement establishing a partnership between the EC and Turkey states that inspiration will be taken from the basic provisions of the Rome Treaty as to the freedom of movement of workers. These basic provisions envisage no discrimination between workers "on the basis of nationality." In addition, article 36 of the Annex Protocol provides for freedom of movement to be realized "in stages" over a 20-year period (until 1986) from the effective date (1964) of the

Ankara Agreement. It is clear that the word "stages" in this article means that freedom would be expanded a little each year and all obstacles would be removed by the end of 1986. In other words, every step back from the level of freedom that has been attained is a violation of the Annex Protocol.

"The 1978 application by the Turkish Government to freeze its obligations to the EC for a period of 5 years cannot be used as an excuse in this matter. Turkey's obligations were to be suspended for a time owing only to its economic difficulties cited in this application. Nevertheless, the government in power today officially retracted our application for postponement before any final decision on it was made.

"Placing a visa requirement on Turkish citizens will create negative effects on Turkish-German economic relations beyond the question of worker movement. Turkish businessmen are justly beginning to feel doubt and concern as to whether the Germans desire cooperation with Turks in such matters as foreign trade, investments and other economic areas. The feelings will significantly affect the desire of our industrialists and businessmen to seek new business opportunities with Germany, and this will have a negative effect on the developing economic and diplomatic relations between the two nations.

"For this reason, the Turkish labor and business world will take every opportunity to get this decision revoked by the German Government and will make a common effort to inform the public of this situation. Meanwhile, a delegation of businessmen is making preparations to go to Germany as soon as possible for talks with German authorities.

"Moreover, contacts are in progress with the Turkish Confederation of Labor on the subject of working together owing to the importance of this matter from the standpoint of the Turkish labor movement.

"We request your aid and assistance both in informing Turkish and German public opinion and in obtaining results in other activities related to this matter."

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TOKER EXAMINES STATE OF RPP

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Aug 80 p 8

/Article by Metin Toker: "RPP Tragedy"/

/Text/ Despite its being one of the two largest parties and having the most numerous group in the National Assembly, everyone sees that the RPP is not exerting any constructive influence on Turkish political life. Forget about guiding events; this fine old party is now like a dry leaf caught in the current of a mountain stream, bumping from one shore to the other. It has neither opinion nor ideology, neither strategy nor tactics, neither goal nor purpose. The "Grand Old Party" of Ataturk and Inonu is going down the drain under the leadership of a general chairman who every day, and sometimes twice a day, says in a most irresponsible manner any incoherent nonsense that pops into his mind and calls it "party policy." This inconsistent a man's having such carefree freedom of action is something unheard of in a serious, settled mass party. Everything shows that Demirel has again taken Ecevit by the hand and is leading him to early elections which will be worse for the RPP than any other party.

Ecevit allowed this government to be formed after the 14 October interim elections. He took himself out of government. Leaving the president no other alternative, he took the ridiculous position that the JP /Justice Party/ should be the government and acted as its defender. He pushed the Nationalist Action Party's and, with vigor, the NSP /National Salvation Party/'s reluctant support into position behind Demirel. If there was a plan, it could only have been "to exhaust the JP by 1981."

But several months later, the same Ecevit came out with a formula for a "broadly based government"; even he did not know what it was. It was once necessary to find a formula for replacing the existing government in order to bring out a new government formula. Ecevit first convinced himself that he had found this in the NSP, then he forced his party group to appear convinced. The RPP group is in such a state that practically no one thinks they will get anywhere with Ecevit, but in order "not to make a bad situation worse," takes a "Let's do it and see" attitude. They are afraid that the general chairman, who prattles nonsense and is in fact a coward, will try to blame them for the lightning he brings down on them and think that if they present no obstacles and leave him alone, he will be the one responsible in the event of failure and that he will admit it.

What purity of good will! Ecevit is the kind who would even take the government's failure off the prime minister's shoulders and place it on "interparty opposition," who would take the absolute failure of the "Erbakan operation" and say, "It was good. We had the opportunity to get acquainted with the NSP," who, when relating things discussed behind closed doors according to his own interpretation and confronted by official denial, would throw the blame on someone else, saying, "My words were misunderstood in the group," who would indict Caglayangil who has never said a single word against a JP-RPP coalition -- while always bad-mouthing it himself calling it "Interim regime - junk regime" -- by saying, "He has been opposed to this coalition for a long time anyway."

Indeed, this is habitual behavior and it is useless to expect the habitue to give up the habit. How I wish Ecevit were a liar and said all these things deliberately, knowing they were false. Ecevit invents things in his own mind which have no basis in fact, then convinces, really convinces himself that they are true; he presents them, sometimes brilliantly, sometimes not, sometimes, in order to convince someone else, using the slogans he is so good at devising, and makes a muddle of everything. Who knows how much of a surprise his words on the "Cankaya conversation" were to the commanders, Caglayangil and Demirel; how they were moved from astonishment to amazement, saying, "Where did he get those ideas!" Everybody who keeps up on events knows that there was no "written text" given at Cankaya. There was not even any new demand; the old demands were repeated. There was no shadow of arms over the Cankaya meeting. There was a sincere effort at reconciliation. There was no question of the acting president's saying what was impossible from this standpoint. What Ecevit said consisted of what he created in his imagination.

This is a habit; but while the possessor of the habit is the unrestrained general chairman of a large and serious party, the "national good" is done great harm by this, until the fact that it is only a habit comes out. Other examples are his claims that Demirel is applying the government's new economic policy "in order to bring dictatorship to Turkey," that this government wants fascism more than anything else and that it plans everything according to this goal. Another product of his imagination is that after working with Erbakan to bring this government down, a "broadly based government" would be formed which the RPP would direct or even participate in. As man had a God, What Erbakan has said is that he will go to early elections unless a government is formed with himself as prime minister. It is impossible for anybody who knows Turkish to perceive Erbakan's words any other way. It is only Ecevit who deludes himself with the dream that "Erbakan says that, but actually what he means is that after the government falls he is ready to form an administration with us that will last until 1981." And a group leader of his still reeling party can speak of how RPP votes will join NSP votes in the parliamentary questioning on the basis of "Why did he not send troops to Afghanistan?" of Foreign Minister Erkmen, who has pursued a virtually "classic RPP foreign policy."

At the risk of making Ataturk and Inonu turn over in their graves...

I would assure you that, if the RPP finds itself in early elections, "the only natural result," after this operation, the general chairman will come to the microphone here and there and personally bring the good news to the more than half of his national deputies who will not be reelected that "their efforts successfully brought about early elections in the end."

Habit, but what a habit.

There are certain things that you have to write or you cannot face yourself. The tragedy of the RPP is Ecevit. /It has become imperative to speak up and say what everybody in the RPP knows/ /in boldface/ because behind this irresponsible temperament is a great party which is irresponsibly putting its label on the most dangerous figments of the imagination. First Ecevit was talking about an "August menace." A product of his unhealthy imagination! When he tried to sell this to the other groups as a motivating factor in the previous operation to bring down the government, the quota group, for instance, which knows, explained to him that "the will of the army is supreme in the army heirarchy." It is seen from this that they were unable to cure Ecevit's "hallucinations" as the general chairman has once more pushed the RPP general executive board into a new muddle that can only be explained by the July sun. If ~~someone~~ were to ask whom the military complains about most, all fingers would certainly point to Ecevit.

I confess that I find it difficult to understand certain members of the RPP -- as is generally true for certain members of every party. I ask myself what happened to the people I saw and talked with in the office in Paris, at the Officers' Club in Eskisehir, at the dinner table of Ismet Pasa /Inonu/, and I can find no answer.

And perhaps the answer is that insight has failed...as it did in the DP group under Menderes, under the administration of the other leader of the same type, subject to the same hallucinations.

Thank God, it is not Yasslada across the way this time but early elections that will be the present undoing of the RPP.

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